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Chapter 1: Introduction
The topic of education has been a part of many areas of research in economics
for many years. In the most traditional sense, economists measure education by
years of schooling. However, this measurement overlooks all of the complex intrica-
cies of education.
Different schools offer a different quality of education. Different classes lead
to different experiences. Education is also directly tied to non-educational activities
and decisions. Many schools offer extracurricular activities, which add another
component of complexity to the idea of what education is. Additionally, educational
choices can impact household decisions, such as where to live.
This dissertation explores several facets of the economics of education. The
second chapter explores the impact of intradistrict public school choice on the re-
lationship between house prices and elementary school test scores. Research has
established that, in the absence of school choice, house prices are very responsive to
school test scores. Because one’s address typically determines one’s public school,
the choice of where to live also typically determines which school one’s children will
attend. Then, it makes sense that parents will be willing to pay a premium in order
1
to send their child to a better school.
In chapter 2, I examine how the relationship between house prices and elemen-
tary school test scores are affected by the way that students are assigned to schools.
In Jefferson County, Kentucky, elementary schools students are assigned to a cluster
of schools and are not required to attend their local school. Students and parents
may rank up to four elementary schools that are within their cluster. The school
district then uses these rankings to assign students to schools.
In my main empirical approach, I explore the relationship between house prices
and school test scores in Jefferson County, KY using a boundary fixed effects ap-
proach that has been widely used in the literature. This strategy is advantageous
compared to a traditional Ordinary Least Squares approach because it allows me to
control for unobserved neighborhood characteristics shared by houses near the same
catchment-area boundary. The first step in the analysis is to restrict the sample
to houses very close to schools’ catchment area boundaries. In this way, I can re-
strict comparison to houses that are geographically close together. Houses that are
geographically close should share similar neighborhood characteristics. Therefore,
conditional on house characteristics, I can assume that the only difference between
houses on the opposite side of a shared boundary is the quality of the schools avail-
able to each house. Then, by including a set of boundary fixed effects, I can control
for unobserved neighborhood characteristics shared by houses near the same bound-
ary.
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The results of this approach demonstrate a very small relationship between
local school test scores and house prices in Jefferson County. The estimated coeffi-
cient on school test scores is about ten times smaller than what has been estimated
in school districts that do not offer any type of school choice.
As an extension of the boundary fixed effects approach, I also explore the
impact of cluster schools’ characteristics on house prices. This exploration is an im-
portant contribution to the literature, because it is not theoretically obvious what
parents prefer in their child’s school. I investigate whether house prices are respon-
sive to changes in the test scores of non-local cluster schools. I also explore the
importance of schools’ proximity to one’s house.
This results indicate that parents’ preferences in Jefferson County are difficult
to understand. The system of school choice is complicated, so it is not surprising
that the results are not definitive. The results suggest that parents care about the
proximity to the school that their child will attend and that parents also care some
about the quality of the cluster schools.
Using these results, I further extend my analysis to explore how accessibility
to school choice affects the relationship between house prices and school test scores.
Because of the design of the elementary choice program, the accessibility of school
choice varies throughout the district. For example, in areas where the available set
of choice schools are, on average, geographically closer to one’s home, school choice
is a more accessible option than when the choice set of schools are, on average, far
3
from one’s home.
I examine how the relationship between house prices and school quality differs
for houses that have access to many schools versus houses that do not. My results
indicate that in areas where houses have more access to choice, house prices are less
responsive to changes in local school test scores. The results are more ambiguous for
whether the relationship between house prices and the quality of available schools
is affected by accessibility to school choice.
In the third chapter, I study the impact of high school music classes on stu-
dents’ academic outcomes. This topic is of interest because there has been much
debate in recent years over the importance of music education. Some individuals
argue that music education can improve performance in other academic areas, such
as math and science. Other individuals argue that time spent in music education
takes away from time that could be spent on more math and science courses. I
examine whether participation in high school music classes leads to changes in ACT
and SAT test score, academic GPA, whether a student attends college, and whether
a student drops out.
To empirically investigate these effects, I utilize two empirical approaches:
OLS with school fixed effects and propensity score matching. Each approach has
advantages and disadvantages. The advantage of OLS with school fixed effects is
the ability to include fixed effects. The disadvantages of OLS are its restrictive
functional form and the fact that it generally restricts the average treatment effect
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on the treatment to be equal to the average treatment effect (though this may not be
true once fixed effects are estimated). Propensity score matching does not restrict
the average treatment effect on the treated to be equal to the average treatment
effect, and it allows for a less restrictive functional form. However, propensity
score matching is unable to accomodate school fixed effects; therefore, the matching
estimates may be biased upward.
The data used is the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002 from the National
Center for Education Statistics, which surveys approximately 15,000 high school stu-
dents and follows these student for several years. These data are ideal for propensity
score matching because there are many variables that affect both the likelihood of
taking a music class and the outcome variables.
The results demonstrate that music classes have large effects on academic
outcomes. I estimate that taking at least one music class in high school leads to .8
percentage point decrease in dropping out of high school, which is a fifteen percent
decline. Taking at least one music class also leads to large increases in enrollment
at a postsecondary school, increases in enrollment at a four-year college, and small
increases in students’ academic GPA. Taking at least one music class also leads to
approximately two percent improvement in ACT or SAT test scores.
The largest effects are found for students who participate in high school band.
High school band students see a five to eight percentage point increase in post-
secondary school attendance and an approximately five percentage point increase
5
in four-year college attendance. Band students also see statistically significant in-
creases in SAT and ACT scores, scoring approximately three percent higher on both
tests. Participating in high school band also leads to increases of about two tenths
of a points in students’ academic GPA.
6
Chapter 2: The Impact of Intradistrict School Choice on the Rela-
tionship between House Prices and Elementary School
Quality
2.1 Introduction
In recent years, a large body of research has estimated the impact of school
choice on academic outcomes. However, much less is known about the impact of
school choice on non-academic outcomes. One such important outcome is house
prices. In this paper, I investigate the effect of intradistrict public school choice on
the relationship between school quality and house prices.
Previous research has established a positive relationship between house prices
and school quality in school districts where there is no school choice (Black (1999);
Downes and Zabel (2002); Fack and Grenet (2010); Figlio and Lucas (2004); Kane
et al. (2006) are a few examples1). The intuition behind this relationship is that
local school quality is an important determinant of one’s residential location decision.
Parents prefer to live in a location that offers a higher quality education for their
children. In a school district where one’s address determines one’s school, home
buyers bid up the price of a house near a better school. Thus, the desirability of the
1For an extensive review of the literature on the relationship betweeen house prices and school
quality, see Black and Machin (2010).)
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local school is capitalized into house prices.
In this chapter, I investigate how the relationship between house prices and
school quality is affected by a change in the relationship between home address and
school assignment. Specifically, if parents are allowed to choose from among several
public schools within a district, instead of being assigned to a single school based on
their address, how will this change the relationship between house prices and school
quality?
Additionally, this chapter explores the parents’ preferences in the presence
of intadistrict school choice. When parents can choose a school instead of being
assigned to one, I expect that additional factors beyond local school quality will
be capitalized in house prices. Parents presumably place value on the quality of
the available non-local schools. They also may place value on the distance of their
house to potential schools. The extent to which parents value each of these factors is
not obvious. I will use several different measures of quality and distance to explore
parents’ preferences.
In order to explore these questions, I examine an extensive program of public
school choice in Jefferson County, Kentucky. The Jefferson County Public School
District (JCPS) contains the city of Louisville and the entirety of Jefferson County.
It is the 28th largest school district in the United States, with approximately 98,000
students (Snyder and Dillow, 2011)2. As I will describe in detail later, elementary,
middle, and high school students all have the option of exercising school choice.
I will focus on elementary schools for two reasons. First, there are many more
elementary schools than middle or high schools. Second, the choice program at the
elementary level is structured slightly differently from the choice program in middle
2This statistic is based on Fall 2008 enrollment figures. JCPS enrollment numbers are compa-
rable to Detroit City Public Schools (97,000) and Baltimore County Public Schools (103,000).
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and high schools and is more suitable for my empirical approach.
I hypothesize that house prices will be less responsive to local school quality
(as measured by test scores) when students have the opportunity to exercise choice,
compared to a situation where students cannot exercise choice. In a scenario where
there is school choice, parents are no longer required to live in a specific geographical
area in order to send their children to their preferred school. As a consequence, I
expect that parents’ willingness-to-pay for a home near a high quality local school
will be less than their willingness-to-pay if the district did not offer choice.
As a practical matter, the hypothesis that school choice will weaken the rela-
tionship between house prices and school quality is difficult to test. First, I must
address the endogeneity of house characteristics and school quality. In a traditional
hedonic price regression, a consumer’s choice over a good such as housing amounts
to choosing the preferred bundle of house and neighborhood characteristics (e.g.
square footage, income of neighbors, school quality). In the hedonic regression,
school quality may be correlated with unobserved characteristics of a house’s neigh-
borhood. For example, better schools tend to be located in wealthier neighborhoods.
If individuals are willing to pay a premium not just for a better school but also to
live in a neighborhood with these unobserved characteristics, then this will bias the
effect of school quality on house prices.
To address this issue, I adopt a regression discontinuity approach developed
by Black (1999). This approach has been utilized extensively in the literature (See
Black and Machin (2010) for a review of the literature.). The first step in the
analysis is to restrict the sample to houses very close to schools’ catchment area
boundaries. In this way, I can restrict comparison to houses that are geographically
close together. Houses that are geographically close should share similar neighbor-
hood characteristics. Therefore, conditional on house characteristics, I can assume
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that the only difference between houses on opposite sides of a shared boundary is the
quality of the schools available to each house. Then, by including a set of boundary
fixed effects, I can control for unobserved neighborhood characteristics shared by
houses near the same boundary.3
In addition to the endogeneity of school quality, another empirical difficulty
will be how to measure school choice. The school choice program is in place for the
entirety of the time period for which I have data; therefore, I need to use another
source of variation in the availability of school choice within the district. Because
of the design of the elementary choice program, the accessibility of school choice
varies throughout the district, causing some areas to have more choice and some to
have less choice. For example, in areas where the available set of school choices are,
on average, geographically closer to one’s home, school choice is a more accessible
option than when the school choices are, on average, farther from one’s home.
In areas where choice is more accessible, I expect house prices to be less re-
sponsive to local school quality changes than in previous studies, because parents
can more easily send their child to an alternative school. My results support this
hypothesis. The coefficient estimate of the impact of local school quality changes
on house prices is about 2.5 times smaller in areas with more choice compared to
areas with less choice.
Additionally, I expect house prices to be responsive to changes in other school
quality measures (in addition to one’s local school quality), once school choice is
available. I find that when a house is, on average, far from any available school
choices, house prices are more responsive to changes in local school quality and
less responsive to changes in cluster school quality. This finding suggests that par-
3I will eliminate boundaries where this assumption is unlikely to hold, such as school boundaries
that are also natural boundaries, like rivers or major highways.
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ents value a smaller distance from their house to their child’s school. I also find
that when a house is far from the best schools, house prices are more responsive to
changes in local school quality and less responsive to changes in cluster school qual-
ity. This suggests that parents value the quality of the available schools in addition
to proximity to these schools.
One point that should be kept in mind is that this school choice program is
unique to Jefferson County, Kentucky. The way students are assigned to schools
and the way they choose schools is complicated and unlike other school districts in
the United States. For this reason, the results may not be generalizable to other
school districts in the US. This is simply an exploration of the relationship between
house prices and test scores within this very interesting school district.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 provides
background on the JCPS choice program. Section 2.3 presents a conceptual frame-
work. Section 2.4 describes the data. Sections 2.5 through 2.8 present my empirial
strategies and main results. Section 2.9 contains extensions and robustness checks.
Section 2.10 concludes.
2.2 Background
The Jefferson County Public School District is the 28th largest school district
in the United States. To my knowledge, it is one of the few school districts in the
United States that offer school choice to all of its students.4 The type of school
choice available is intradistrict public school choice, such that students may choose
from among public schools within their district.5
4Chicago Public Schools has a system of public school choice that is most comparable to that
in Jefferson County.
5Other types of school choice are interdistrict, where some students may have the option of
attending a school that is not in their school district. The term school choice can also refer to
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In 1992, JCPS introduced the school choice plan that I study.6 At the elemen-
tary level, students may apply to any elementary school that is within their cluster.
A cluster is defined as a group of 5 to 12 elementary schools, where a student who
lives in the catchment area of any one of the cluster schools may apply to attend
any school that is in the same cluster. There are a total of twelve clusters in JCPS.
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 display the division of clusters, with 6 clusters shown per map
to make the distinctions between clusters more visible.
One will notice that the clusters are mostly non-contiguous. Cluster 9 is the
only completely contiguous cluster within the county. By contiguous, I mean that
every school within the cluster is bordered by at least one other school in the same
cluster, and there are no geographic holes in the cluster. In this way, Cluster 9 is
very different from the other clusters. Many school catchment areas do not share
any part of their border with a school area in the same cluster (e.g. most schools
in cluster 11). The clusters were structured in this way in order to have a more
diverse population of students in each cluster.7 Though the cluster schools can be
far apart, each student is guaranteed free transportation to any school within his or
her cluster.
Students may apply to any of the schools within their assigned cluster. The
process is illustrated in Figure 2.3 and works as follows. First, the student is ten-
tatively assigned to a residence-based school based on the student’s home address.
the availability of charter schools or private schools. Jefferson County does not have any charter
schools. It also does not allow for interdistrict school choice.
6The school choice program was a modification of a busing system that was implemented in
1975 as a result of a court order to desegregate (Kleber, 2001) The school choice plan that I study
was again modified in 2010.
7Because JCPS includes both the city of Louisville and the rest of Jefferson County, the district
varies from very urban to very rural. Like many cities in the US, the inner-city area is mostly
black, and the county becomes more white as one moves away from the city center. In order to
increase racial diversity, the school district requires that at least one school from a mostly black
neighborhood be included in every cluster. Thus, most clusters contain both urban and rural
schools.
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I call this the local school. In Figure 2.3, a student who lives within the hatched
area is assigned to school A as his or her local school school. The hatched area is
what is typically referred to as the catchment area for a school. In a district where
there is no school choice, students who live within the catchment area of a school
are definitively assigned to that school. Thus, the first step of the assignment pro-
cess in JCPS is identical to the process for assigning students to a residence-based
school in a district where there is no choice, except that the assignment in JCPS is
not mandatory, nor does the assignment guarantee the student a spot at the local
school.
As a result of the residence-based school assignment, a student also knows the
cluster to which he or she belongs. All school areas that are shaded gray in Figure
2.3 belong to the same cluster as the hatched school. The student who lives in the
hatched area may apply to school A and/or any of the schools in the gray areas.
Similarly, if a student lives in a gray area, he or she may apply to school A or any
other schools in the gray area.
To apply to a school, a student must submit a choice application. Approxi-
mately fifty percent of JCPS students submit such an application. On the applica-
tion, students may rank up to four school choices within their cluster.8 The school
district reviews the applications and assigns each student to a school.
The assignment process is based soley on three criteria: the address of the
student, the student’s race, and the school’s capacity constraints. Students who
8Transfers between clusters are allowed. However, transfers are considered on a case by case
basis, and parents must provide documentation for why they would like their child to attend
a school in a different cluster. The most common reasons for transfers are if a student’s sibling
attends a school in a different cluster, a student having behavioral problems that they believe can be
addressed in a different cluster, or if a student needs special attention (such as a learning disability)
and there is a school in a different cluster better suited to handle that student. Approximately
10% of students attend a cluster that is not their assigned cluster. This information was obtained
by speaking directly with the school district.
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live in the catchment area of a school are given first priority to attend that school.
Students who do not submit a choice appliation are assumed to prefer the local school
but may be sent to other schools if the local school faces capacity constraints. If
there are more applicants than space permits, a student will be somewhat randomly
selected to attend the school (I describe this process with two scenarios below).
Additionally, schools must have a demographic make-up of at least fifteen percent,
but no more than fifty percent, black students. Where the school lies between those
racial guidelines is up to the principal of the school. The applications are divided
into four groups: black males, black females, white males, and white females. A
computer randomly sorts each list. The principal then selects a number of students
from each list that satisfies the racial guidelines and the capacity constraints. The
application data are discarded each year after the assignment process is completed
and thus are not available to me. What the reader should take away from this
process is that applications to schools are not merit-based. Additionally, a student
has the best chance of getting a spot at a school if he or she lives in the catchment
area of that school.
To illustrate this point, I describe two scenarios below to illustrate the ways
in which students may be assigned to a school such that the racial and capacity
constraints are satisfied.
Scenario 1
Suppose there are 100 seats available at new school A. 200 students apply.
Seventy-five of these students are from school A’s assignment area. Of these students
25 are black, and 50 are white. Of the 125 students who applied from outside A’s
assignment area, 55 are black, and 70 are white. School A will admit all 75 of the
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students from its assignment area. It is then up to the principal to fill the remaining
spots. The students who applied from outside A’s assignment area will be divided
into four groups: white males, white females, black males, and black females. A
computer will place the names within each group in a random order. The principal
will then choose how many students to accept from each group. While he or she
may choose the race and gender of the remaining students, the principal must start
at the top of each list and work down, such that selection within each list is random.
Even in this simple case, the eventual outcome is uncertain. Because the
school is already 25% black, the principal could potentially choose only white stu-
dents to fill the remaining seats. Following the same argument, the principal could
also choose only black students without violating the racial guidelines. According
to anecdotal evidence, the choice is up to the preferences of the principal and the
needs of other schools within the cluster. If several other schools have too many
black applicants, for instance, then it is likely that school A will accept more black
students and send the remaining white applicants to other schools in the cluster.
See the next scenario for this possibility.
Scenario 2
Suppose there are 100 seats available at new school B. Two-hundred students
apply. 150 of these students are from school B’s assignment area. Of these students
125 are black, and 25 are white. Of the 50 students who applied from outside B’s
assignment area, 40 are black, and 10 are white. The school must be no more than
50% black. Therefore, all white applicants will be accepted. But this brings the
school to only 35% white. Additional white applicants must come from students
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who listed the school as second, third, or fourth place, or from students who did not
send in a choice application at all. Relating this scenario to scenario 1, some white
students who listed school A as a first choice may be sent to school B in order to
increase the percentage or white students at school B.
Additional scenarios could be discussed, but one can already see that the
assignment process has the potential to be complex. The racial guidelines, combined
with priority to local residents, makes assignment and application strategic in an
unpredictable way to the econometrician. Because my unit of observation is the
house, I do not know the race of any household members, nor do I know how they
ranked schools in the application process. What I do know is that a student has the
best chance of getting a spot at a school if he or she lives in the catchment area of
that school. However, because of the choice options, parents do not need to live near
their preferred school in order to send their child to that school. For this reason, I
hypothesize that the prices for houses near the best schools will not be bid as high
as they would have been in the absence of school choice.
In the next section, I describe my conceptual framework for examining the
relationship between local and/or neighborhood school quality and house prices.
2.3 Conceptual Framework
There is a large body of research examining the relationship between house
prices and school quality. My analysis is based on the hedonic price model developed
by Rosen (1974). In this model, the price of a house can be described as a function
of the house’s observable characteristics (number of bedrooms, square footage, etc.)
and its neighborhood characteristics. For instance, if a house is located near a
very nice public park, we might expect to see a higher price for that house, which
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would reflect the homeowner’s value of the park. If we assume that the house and
neighborhood characteristics enter the equation linearly, we can write this model as:
ln(price)i,n = β0 +Xiβ1 +Nnβ2 + εi,n, (2.1)
where Xi is a vector of house characteristics, which includes school quality, and Nn is
a vector of neighborhood characteristics. The coefficients on these vectors describe
a household’s marginal willingness-to-pay for each characteristic.
Given that we expect that parents prefer higher quality education for their
children, we would expect that houses located in the catchment area of better schools
to fetch a higher price than houses located in the catchment area of lesser quality
schools. The literature has found that when school quality is measured using test
scores, houses in the catchment area of schools with higher test scores sell for higher
prices (Black (1999); Downes and Zabel (2002); Fack and Grenet (2010); Kane et al.
(2006)). Black (1999) and Fack and Grenet (2010) find that a five percent increase
in test scores leads to an increase of house prices of between 1.5 and 2.5 percent.
The smallest estimates in the literature come from Bayer et al. (2007) who find that
a five percent increase in school quality leads to a one percent increase in house
prices.
Parents in Jefferson County may not be willing to pay as much of a premium
for living in the catchment area of a good school as they would have paid in the ab-
sence of school choice. Machin and Salvanes (2010) utilize a difference-in-differences
strategy before and after the implementation of school choice reform in Norway to
identify the impact of school quality on house prices. They find that the house price
premium for local school quality falls by at least fifty percent when school choice is
introduced.
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Second, parents will now care about characteristics of many schools, not just
the local school. Without school choice, parents need not care about the quality
of other schools in the district. With school choice, there is a non-zero probability
that a child may attend a school other than the local school. Then, even if the
local school is the parents’ preferred school, parents may pay more to have better
alternatives to the local school as insurance against the possibility that their child
may not be given a spot in the local school.
The relationship between house prices and non-local school characteristics is
relatively understudied. (Machin and Salvanes (2010), Hastings et al. (2005), and
Reback (2005) are the studies that I am aware of.) For this reason, it is not obvious
what parents’ preferences are in this case. Parents may prefer to live in a cluster
where the average school quality is higher. They may prefer a cluster where one or
two schools are very good, and not care about the quality of the other schools. They
may be very risk averse and care about the quality of the worst possible school that
their child could attend.
Alternatively, parents may care more about the distance from their house
to their child’s school. Hastings et al. (2005) examine the implementation of an
intra-district school choice program in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. Using
parents’ school choice applications, they find that parents value both quality and
proximity highly. There is reason to believe that parents in Jefferson County may
value proximity highly. According to records kept by JCPS, it is not uncommon
for children to travel more than an hour each way between their house and their
school. This is due to students attending cluster schools that is far from their
homes. Knowing this and knowing the results from Hastings et al. (2005), I expect
that parents may pay more to live in a cluster where the available schools are close
by. I use a variety of independent variables in my analysis to investigate parents’
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preferences with regard to the cluster schools.
2.4 Data
The data for this chapter come from two primary sources. House price data
were obtained from the Jefferson County Property Value Administrator. These
data contain information about all residential arms-length sales in Jefferson County
between 2000 and 2006. For each house, I know its street address, sale date, year
built, number of stories, square footage, acreage, number of bathrooms, whether it
has a basement, whether it has a garage, and whether it has central air-conditioning.
Table 2.1 displays summary statistics for houses in my sample. Column 1
contains all houses from all years. Column 2 restricts the sample to houses that are
within 2000 feet of a school area boundary, which is a standard distance used in the
literature. Column 3 uses houses that are on the “high” side of a boundary. By
high, I mean that the test score of the house’s local school is higher than the test
score of the local school on the opposide side of the boundary. Similary, column 4
uses houses that are on the “low” side of a boundary.
Moving from the full sample to the sample of houses near the boundary, one
will notice that the overall quality of houses diminishes. Houses are slightly smaller,
are on smaller lots, have few stories, etc. However, these differences are not statisti-
cally significant. The decline in quality is due to the fact that the density of housing
is much lower in rural areas. I lose more of my sample in the rural areas than in the
inner-city, poorer areas. This drives the average quality down.
When comparing houses on the high side of a boundary to houses on the
low side of a boundary, prices are higher on the high side. However, other house
characteristics are similar on both sides of the boundary.
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School information was obtained from the Kentucky Department of Education
school report cards and JCPS Data Books. For each school, I have information about
its test scores, student demographics, attendance and disciplinary records, as well
as teacher characteristics. I primarily make use of the test score information.
As is common in the literature, I use test scores as my measure of school
quality. Each year, in January or February, JCPS publishes a report card for each
school. During the time period I study, these report cards were mailed annually to
every student’s home. The report card displays the results from several Kentucky
testing measures, a national test, and other school characteristics such as teachers’
education levels and attendance rates. In addition to these report cards, JCPS
publishes an annual Data Book, which contains information about all schools. One
can view the test scores of all schools in one central location. Anecdoctal evidence
suggests that real estate agents utilize both the report cards and the Data Book when
working with a home buyer. Thus, school quality measures are easily available and
are provided to parents searching for homes.
My primary measure of school quality is the school’s average percentile ranking
on the nationally standardized Comprehensive Test of Basic Skills (CTBS/5). All
third graders in KY took the CTBS5 in each year in my sample. The schools report
scores in reading, math, and language arts. My regressions primarly make use of the
composite score, since results from individual tests are not qualitatively different.9
Table 2.2 displays school summary statistics. Columns 1 through 12 correspond to
cluster 1 through 12. Column 13 contains the summary statistics for all clusters.
There is some variation in the average quality of the clusters; however, most
9While test scores for Kentucky tests are also available, I choose not to use these scores for
a variety of reasons. First, the test itself has changed many times. Second, there is anecdotal
evidence that many individuals do not support the Kentucky testing system. Third, the tests
consist primarily of open-response type questions, which makes the scoring system subjective and
also makes year-to-year comparisons quite difficult.
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clusters are close to the mean test score percentile of around fifty-one percent. The
last row shows the average across all years of the test score of the best school in
the cluster. There is more variation in the test score of the best school than in
the average of all cluster schools. On average, schools with higher test scores tend
to have teachers with more years of experience and more teachers with master’s
degrees. Schools with higher test scores also have lower per-pupil spending. The
school tax rate in Jefferson County is a flat rate throughout the county, and the
money from the entire county is pooled before being distributed to each school.
JCPS tends to increase spending in schools that are not performing as well.
I combine school and house data using ArcGIS, a geographic information sys-
tem for working with maps and geographic information. JCPS provided me with
the exact boundaries for each elementary school area. Additionally, I have the ex-
act street address for every house. By geocoding the house addresses, I am able
to assign each house to a residential-area school and also to a cluster. I can also
calculate the distance from each house to every school in its cluster.
I make further use of ArcGIS when restricting my sample to houses near bound-
aries. I am able to calculate the distance from each house to its nearest boundary,
where a boundary is a segment of a total school area boundary that separates only
two schools. I then draw a buffer zone 2000 feet around each boundary.10 I se-
lect only houses within this buffer zone for my analysis. Houses that are near two
boundaries are assigned to the closest boundary.11 Houses near boundaries that are
geographic dividers, such as rivers or parks, are dropped from the sample.
102000 feet is the standard distance used in the literature. I also do the analysis using a distance
of 1000 feet. The results are qualitatively similar.
11Excluding these houses does little to affect the estimates. Because catchment areas can be
small within the city, there did not seem to be a standard way to choose a distance within which
houses would be excluded from the sample. The previous literature has also assigned houses to
their closest boundary when a house is close to two boundaries.
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2.5 Estimating the Impact of Local School Quality on House Prices
To begin, I utilize an empirical approach first used by Black (1999). This
approach has been widely used in the literature that estimates the impact of school
quality on house prices. Without boundary fixed effects, the estimating equation in
this case is
ln(price)i,s,n,t = α + βQualitys,t +Xiδ + Znγ +Ws,tφ+ λt + εi,s,n,t, (2.2)
where ln(price)i,s,n,t is the natural log of the price per square foot of house i assigned
to local school s in neighborhood n at time t, Qualitys,t is some measure of school
quality available to house i, Xi is a vector of house characteristics (number of stories,
year built, square footage, etc), Zn is a vector of neighborhood characteristics (racial
composition, percent below the poverty line, percent homeowners, etc), and Ws,t, a
vector of school characteristics (such as per-pupil spending, student-teacher ratio,
and attendance rate).
This approach will lead to biased coefficients if there are unobserved house and
neighborhood characteristics that are correlated with school quality. To reduce this
bias, Black (1999) proposed a boundary fixed effects approach (also referred to as a
boundary discontinuity approach), which I use as my baseline empirical strategy.
First, I restrict my sample to include only houses that are within 2000 feet
of a catchment-area boundary. Figure 4 displays the houses that will be selected.
Houses near the same boundary should have similar neighborhood characteristics.
A 2000 foot buffer zone is drawn around each boundary. Houses that lie within
this buffer zone are included in my sample. In addition to restricting the sample
in this way, I also estimate a full set of boundary fixed effects. The identification
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assumption is that the only difference between houses that share a boundary is the
quality of the local school and potentially also the quality of the cluster (conditional
on house characteristics). Equation 2.2 then becomes:
ln(price)i,s,b,t = α + βQualitys,t +Xiδ + θb + λt + εi,s,b,t. (2.3)
θb is a vector of boundary fixed effects, which should account for any unobserved
characteristics shared by houses on either side of a particular boundary. Notice that
neighborhood characteristics no longer need to be included, as the key assumption
for this strategy is that houses near the same boundary share the same neighborhood
characteristics. I estimate equation 2.3 for houses less than 2000 feet from a school
area boundary. Standard errors are clustered at the school level.12 I expect β to be
positive.
Before presenting the results, one should consider the possibility that test
scores are a proxy for other school characteristics. Due to the racial capacity con-
straints in schools, it is possible that test scores are a proxy for other characteristics,
such as the racial composition of a school. Alternatively, test scores might be a proxy
for student/teacher ratio or the quality of teachers. Bayer et al. (2007) show that
households prefer to self-segregate by race. Parents then may also prefer to send
their child to a school where he or she is in the majority race. I do not directly test
for this, but it is a possibility.
Table 2.3 presents results using the local school’s CTBS total score as the
independent variable. Column 1 displays the results from estimating equation 2.2
without any controls, a baseline OLS regression of price on test scores. The co-
12One could also cluster at the boundary level, or the cluster level. It is not obvious what the
appropriate level of clustering is. The standard procedure in the literature is to cluster at the
school level.
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efficient on the test score implies that a five percent increase in local school test
score is associated with a two percent increase in house prices. Column 2 presents
the results from estimating equation 1 with controls for house characteristics and
year effects, the standard hedonic model. Though the estimates from Columns 1
and 2 are biased, it is important to note that both coefficients are positive and
demonstrate a strong correlation between house prices and local school test scores.
Column 3 presents results from estimating equation 2.2 on the sample of houses
that are less than 2000 feet from a school area boundary. This column shows that
the later results are not driven by the restricted sample. Column 4 displays my
preferred estimation results. Here, I estimate equation 2.3, the boundary fixed
effects approach. The coefficient on school quality is much smaller than in previous
columns. Comparing column 3 to column 4, the magnitude of the coefficient falls
by about eighty percent. This drop is consistent with the literature that uses a
boundary fixed effects approach. Other researchers have found that the addition of
boundary fixed effects causes the coefficient on school quality to fall by at least fifty
percent (Bayer et al., 2007; Fack and Grenet, 2010).
Estimates obtained when the sample is restricted to houses less than 1000
feet from a catchment area boundary are qualitatively similar and are presented in
Appendix Table 2.1.
A comparison of the magnitudes of my coefficient estimates to those from the
literature shows that these estimates are much smaller than those from the literature
that examines the responsiveness of house prices to school quality in the absence
of school choice. Black (1999) found that parents are willing to pay two and a half
percent more in house prices for a five percent increase in test scores. Based on
a mean composite test score percentile of fifty percent, a five percent increase in
the local school’s composite test scores scores in Jefferson County would lead to
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between two and three tenths of a percent increase in house prices. These estimates
are approximately ten times smaller than those found previously in the literature in
settings with no school choice. This is a substantial difference.
This difference is consistent with the existing research that focuses on districts
with schools choice. Reback (2005) examines the impact of the adoption of several
school choice programs on house prices in Minnesota. He finds that properties
appreciate significantly in school districts that students may transfer out of. In
school districts that accept transfers, property values declined. Machin and Salvanes
(2010) find that the house price premium for local school quality falls by at least
fifty percent when school choice is introduced in a school district in Norway. Thus,
both this chapter and previous research suggest that the presence of school choice
doesn’t just slightly diminish the effect of school test scores on house prices. The
presence of school choice substantially mitigates the impact of local school quality
on house prices. In Jefferson County, the impact of school test scores on house prices
is very small.
These results could alternatively imply that preferences in Jefferson County
are dramatically different from preferences in other school districts. Or, it might
be the case that school quality is being mismeasured, because I have included only
local school test scores in the analysis so far. This possibility leads to a natural
follow-up. Are other schools’ test scores capitalized into house prices instead of the
local school’s test score?
2.6 Estimating the Impact of Cluster School Quality on House Prices
In the previous section, I found that house prices respond less to local school
quality in a district with school choice than they do in the absence of school choice.
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I expect that characteristics of other available schools will also be capitalized into
house prices. However, it is not obvious which characteristics of available schools
will be important to parents and students. Will the quality of the closest schools
be capitalized into house prices? Or will it be the quality of the best schools? The
distance to the best schools?
Hastings et al. (2005) examine the implementation of an intra-district school
choice program in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. Using parents’ school
choice applications, they find that parents value both quality and proximity highly.
Based on these findings, I also examine the extent to which parents value cluster
school quality and proximity to cluster schools in JCPS. To estimate the relationship
between house prices and these characteristics, I explore the relationship between
house prices and several different measures of cluster school characteristics.
First, I regress house prices on a measure of cluster school quality. The first
measure is simply an average of the CTBS composite scores of the top three highest
scoring schools in one’s cluster13:
(CTBS1 + CTBS2 + CTBS3)
3
For the second measure, I include each of the top three cluster schools’ test scores
separately to allow more flexibility in the estimation. Third, I measure cluster
quality as a weighted average of the CTBS scores of the top three highest scoring












13The local school is included in the set of available cluster schools.
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I expect the coefficient on each measure of cluster quality to be positive.
Table 2.4 presents results from regressing house prices on the three measures
of cluster school quality. All columns include estimates of year effects and controls
for house characteristics. The sample is restricted to houses less than 2000 feet from
a catchment-area boundary. Columns 1-3 do not include boundary fixed effects.
Columns 4-6 do include boundary fixed effects.
As expected, there is a positive relationship between average cluster school
quality and house prices when fixed effects are not estimated. When fixed effects
are included, the magnitudes of the coefficients drop substantially and are sometimes
the wrong sign. When each school’s test scores enter into the regression separately,
the coefficients on the top two schools’ scores are very small, and the coefficient
on the first and second best schools are actually negative. Most of the effect is
captured in the third best school’s test score. This suggests that parents may care
about the worst possible schools that their child could attend. This would make
sense in Jefferson County, as clusters seem to be designed such that each cluster has
at least one of the district’s better schools.14 Thus, every cluster has at least one or
two good options. Where the clusters begin to differ is in how many good schools
they have and how many bad schools they have. Recall that parents may rank up
to four schools on their application. If parents are worried that their child may end
up attending their third choice school, it makes sense for the quality of the third
best school to be capitalized into house prices.
Regarding the negative coefficient on the first and second best schools, it is
not clear what is driving this result. Without boundary fixed effects, the coefficients
are positive. It is not until boundary fixed effects are estimated that the coefficient
14Technically, the clusters are designed to have several schools with different racial compositions.
Because the racial composition is correlated with test score, this effectively means that each cluster
has schools with varying levels of test scores.
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becomes negative.
Comparing the magnitude of the coefficient on cluster schools’ test scores to
the coefficient on local school test score, the results are inconclusive as to whether
house prices are more responsive to the quality of cluster schools or local schools.
Without boundary fixed effects, the coefficient on the third best cluster school is
slightly higher than the coefficient on the local school test score. However, when
boundary fixed effects are included, the coefficient on local school test score is about
twice this size of the coefficient on the third best cluster school. It makes sense that
parents would pay more attention to the test scores of the local school, as this is
the school that their child is most likely to attend.
With regard to boundary fixed effects, recall that we know that the coefficient
on local school quality is biased without the inclusion of boundary fixed effects,
because it is positively correlated with unobserved neighborhood characteristics. In
Table 2.3, I included a full set of boundary fixed effects to account for this bias.
When the current specification is estimated with a full set of controls and boundary
fixed effects, the coefficient on cluster quality becomes very small, occasionally the
wrong sign, and of less statistical significance. This is true for all measures of cluster
quality. It is unclear exactly what is driving these results. It could be that the
fixed effects are exacerbating measurement error. It may be that cluster quality is
unimportant or has unexpected effects on house prices. Furthermore, it is plausible
that the boundary fixed effects approach is inappropriate and/or insufficient in this
context.15
15It is not obvious how cluster school quality is correlated with unobserved neighborhood quality.
Because cluster schools are not necessarily near one’s house, there need not be a positive correlation
between one’s own neighborhood quality and cluster school test scores. In fact, it could be that
because better schools are located in better neighborhoods, the impact of a high-scoring cluster
school’s neighborhood on house prices would be negative, as one’s own neighborhood becomes
relatively less desirable. It is unclear how to account for this bias, and it is also likely that
boundary fixed effects do not properly overcome this bias.
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Even though I cannot definitively determine the extent to which cluster school
quality is capitalized into house prices, as the coefficients vary in both magnitude
and sign, the results provide additional support for the estimate of local school
quality’s impact on house prices. The estimate of the impact of local school quality
on house prices is similar to what was estimated in Table 2.3 without boundary
fixed effects. Estimates with the boundary fixed effects are similar to column 4 of
Table 2.3.
2.7 Estimating the Importance of Proximity
Next, I estimate the importance of proximity. First, I regress house prices
on the test scores of the closest cluster schools. Second, I regress house prices on
both test scores and the distance from one’s house to available schools. I estimate
variants of the following equation:
ln(price)i,s,b,t = α + β1Qs,t + β2Distancei,s + β3(Qs,t ×Distancei,s)+
3∑
c=1
[φ1,cQc,t + φ2,cDistancei,c + φ3,c(Qc,t ×Distancei,c)] +Xiδ + θb + λt + εi,s,b,t,
(2.4)
where Distancei,s is the distance (in thousands of feet) from house i to the local
school s, and Distancei,c is the distance from house i to cluster school c.
Table 2.5 presents the results from regressing house prices on the test scores of
While approximately thirty percent of students attend a school that is not their local school,
those students are fairly evenly distributed amongst the cluster schools. On average, five percent
of students from a given school area attend the top cluster school. Whether this is because parents
did not choose this school or because the school was oversubscribed, I cannot know. Access to the
school choice applications would be necessary to conduct further investigations of the relationship
between cluster school quality and house prices. Unfortunately, those records are not available
from the school district.
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the three cluster schools closest to each house. Distance measures are not included
in this preliminary regression. The magnitude of the coefficient on test scores of
cluster schools is positive and statistically significant, except for the third closest
cluster school.
One will also notice that when test scores of each school enter the regression
equation separately, the test score of the local school (which is also typically the
closest school) has the largest impact on house prices. As schools become progres-
sively farther away, the magnitude of the coefficients declines, indicating that house
prices become less responsive to changes in the school’s test scores as the available
school gets farther away. This suggests that both test scores and the proximity of
one’s available schools are important, confirming Hastings et al. (2005)’s result that
proximity is an important decision when parents apply to schools.
In the next two tables, I estimate the full specification of equation (2.4). I
will estimate this equation twice. The first time, I rank the cluster schools by test
scores, meaning cluster school 1 will be the highest scoring cluster school, and cluster
schools 2 and 3 will be the next two highest scoring cluster schools. The second time,
I rank the cluster schools by proximity, meaning cluster school 1 will be the closest
cluster school, and cluster schools 2 and 3 will be the next two closest schools.
Table 2.6 show results from estimating the impact of distance on house prices
using the highest scoring cluster schools. For local schools, the coefficient on dis-
tance is negative when the interaction term is not included, implying that as you
move farther from the school, house prices decline. When the interaction between
test score and distance is included, the coefficient on distance is positive, and the
coefficient on the interaction is negative. Though the coefficients are not statisti-
cally significant, the signs are as expected. The coefficients imply that when test
scores are low, house prices decrease as one moves closer to the school. But when
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test scores are high, house prices increase as one moves closer to the school.
For the cluster schools, the results are more ambiguous. The coefficients on
cluster distances and the interactions are very small, statistically insignificant and
mostly the wrong sign. Given that the system of school choice in Jefferson County
is very complicated, it is not surprising that the results are unclear. Because many
cluster are, on average, very similar, and because the distance between schools varies
dramatically both within and across clusters, it is difficult to infer the degree to
which parents value distance from and quality of cluster schools. To further explore
the importance of proximity, I next estimate a similar relationship; however, the
cluster schools will now be ranked by proximity, rather than by test scores.
The columns of Table 2.7 estimate the same relationships as columns 3-6 of
Table 2.6, except that the cluster schools are ranked by their distance from the
house of interest, instead of by test score. All coefficients have a higher statistical
significance than in Table 2.7. But, again, the magnitudes and the signs of the
coefficients are still occassionally the wrong sign.
In general, Tables 2.6 and 2.7 suggest that, for cluster schools, distance is
slightly more important than the quality of the school. This makes sense for Jefferson
County. The distances between cluster schools can be large. Some parents report
that their student rides the school bus for more than one hour each way, and some
students must ride more than one bus to get to school. With such large distances
to travel, it is not surprising that parents place a lot of weight on how close they
might be to potential schools.
Beyond this preference for proximity, the results also suggest that determining
the preferences of parents living in Jefferson County is not a simple matter. Because
of the non-contiguity of clusters, parents must carefully examine their location with
regard to a number of factors: the possibile distances from potential schools to their
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house, the potential quality of potential schools, and the likelihood of acceptance at
each school.
Though Tables 2.6 and 2.7 provide less clear results, Tables 2.4 and 2.5 suggest
that parents care about both proximity and the test scores of potential schools. In
the next section, I use these results to develop a strategy to test the impact of varied
degrees of school choice on the relationship between house prices and school quality.
2.8 Estimating the Impact of Access to School Choice
To directly estimate the impact of school choice on the relationship between
house prices and school quality, I make use of parents’ preferences for particular
cluster school characteristics and exploit the design of the cluster system in JCPS.
Recall that most clusters in JCPS are non-contiguous, meaning that school catch-
ment areas generally do not share a catchment area boundary with other schools
in the same cluster. Because of this non-contiguity, some houses are far away from
the available cluster schools and other houses are relatively close to their available
cluster schools. Additionally, there are differences in the quality of nearby or far
away cluster schools.
Because of these differences, the accessibility of choice varies throughout both
the school district and one’s cluster. To illustrate this point, consider two ficticious
clusters, A and Z. Cluster A contains schools A, B, C, and D. Cluster Z contains
schools W, X, Y, and Z. Suppose the average test score in each cluster is the same.
Also suppose that school A and school Z have the same test score. Now, consider two
families, one that lives in school A’s catchment area and one that lives in school Z’s
catchment area. Based on test scores, the clusters are essentially identical. However,
suppose that schools A, B, C, and D are all less than five miles from the house in
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school A’s catchment area. And suppose that schools W, X, and Y are all more than
fifteen miles from the house in school Z’s catchment area. Even though both houses
have the option of choosing a school other than their local school, that option is
more accessible to the family in school A’s catchment area because the house is very
close to all of the available schools.
The previous section revealed several results regarding parents’ preferences.
First, parents care about proximity. Second, parents care about the test scores of
cluster schools. Third, parents may care about the worst possible outcome for their
child and thus care about the marginal cluster school that is ranked near last but
could still be attended. Based on these observations, I make several assumptions
about the accessibility of choice. I claim that when a house is very close to its cluster
schools, choice is very accessible, and when a house is very far away from its cluster
schools, choice is much less accessible. I also claim that when a house is very close
to the best cluster schools, choice is more accessible compared to houses far from
the best cluster schools.
Based on these assumptions, I can now test whether house prices are more or
less responsive to changes in school quality when there is more or less school choice.
I expect that the coefficient on local school test scores will be higher for houses
in areas where choice is less accessible compared to houses in areas where choice
in more accessible. I expect that the coefficients on cluster school test scores will
be lower in areas where choice is less accessible comapred to houses in areas where
choice is more accessible.
I test whether house prices are more or less responsive to changes in school
quality when there is more or less school choice by dividing my sample based on
the accessibility of choice and then estimating the relationship between house prices
and school quality for each group in the sample. To do this, I first construct several
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measures of school choice accessibility. Below, I describe each measure of accessi-
bility. For each measure, choice is most accessible when the value of the measure is
smallest.
1. The average of the distances between a house and its three closest cluster schools.
2. The average of the distances between a house and all cluster schools.
3. The distance between a house and the best cluster school.
4. The average distance between a house and the top three cluster schools.
After constructing the measures, I divide the sample into quartiles of each
measure, such that the lowest quartile has the most choice accessibility and the
highest quartile has the least choice accessibility. For each measure, I then estimate
a new regression equation, where I interact the indicators of choice accessbility
quartile with the school quality variables to test whether houses are more or less
responsive to changes in school quality when the accessibility of choice is different.
The estimating equation is
ln(price)i,s,b,t = α +
4∑
q=1
[βq(Qualitys,t × Qq)] + Xiδ + λt + εi,s,b,t, (2.5)
where Qualitys,t is the test score of the local school and Qq are dummy variables
indicating that the house belongs to the qth quartile of choice accessibility. Qq
can correspond to any of the four accessibility measures described previously. Each
dummy variable is also included in the estimating equation. Equation 2.5 will also
be modified to include measures of cluster quality interacted with choice quartile:
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ln(price)i,s,b,t = α +
4∑
q=1
[βq(Qualitys,t ×Qq) + γq(Qualityc,t ×Qq)] +Xiδ + λt + εi,s,b,t,
(2.6)
where Qualityc,t is first the weighted average of top three cluster schools’ test
scores and then the average of the closest three schools’ test scores.
Tables 2.8 - 2.11 show the results from estimating equation 2.6. Each table
uses a different measure of choice accessibility to divide the sample into quartiles.
Each set of rows uses a different measure of cluster school availability to divide
the sample into quartiles. Column 1 of each table estimates the effect of the local
schools’ test score interacted with each quartile. In columns 2 though 5, cluster
schools’ test scores interacted with quartile are also included. In all columns, I also
include controls for each quartile, year effects, and house characteristics. Though I
have not been displaying the results that do not include boundary fixed effects, I do
include these estimates in the following tables. I do this because the results change
so dramatically with the inclusion of boundary fixed effects that it is important
to see this change. I will first discuss the estimated coefficients on local school test
scores, and then I will discuss the estimated coefficients on cluster school test scores.
2.8.1 Local School Quality Effects
In table 2.8, the school choice accessibility index is measured as the average
distance to all cluster schools. This means that houses in quartile 1 are, on average,
closest to their cluster schools. Houses in quartile 4 are, on average, farthest from
their cluster schools. The impact of local school quality on house prices is largest
for households that are, on average, farther from cluster schools. This makes sense;
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if one is far from the available cluster schools, then we would expect parents to care
more about the local school, which is nearby. In columns 2 and 3, the coefficient on
local school quality for houses far from cluster schools is three to four times higher
than this coefficient for houses close to cluster schools. However, one should not
rely on the estimates from columns 2 and 4 because they do not use boundary fixed
effects. The pattern of the coefficients is still present in columns 1, 3, and 5, though
the coefficients are not as dramatically different.
In table 2.9, the school choice accessibility index is measured as the average
distance to the closest three cluster schools. I chose three schools because parents
are allowed to rank up to four schools. These results echo the results of table 2.8.
Even with fixed effects included, the effect of local school test scores on house prices
is largest for houses that are farthest from the closest three cluster schools.
Tables 2.9 and 2.10 incorporate both distance and quality into the choice
accessibility index. In table 2.9, the index is measured as the average distance to
the highest scoring three cluster schools. As in tables 2.8 and 2.9, one can see that
the largest effects of local school test scores on house prices are found for houses
farthest from the best cluster schools. This result is even more pronounced than
in tables 2.8 and 2.9. In table 2.10, the choice index is distance to the single best
school in the cluster. Again, when a house is far from the high scoring cluster school,
house prices are more responsive to changes in local school test scores.
2.8.2 Cluster School Quality Effects
For all measures of school choice accessibility, houses that have less access
to choice because they are farther away from the available schools are the most
responsive to local school quality. Houses that have the most access to choice are
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not as responsive to changes in their local school quality.
The results are not so clear-cut with respect to cluster school test scores. When
examining the impact of cluster school test scores on house prices, an interesting
pattern emerges that is present is all of tables 2.8 through 2.11. Without fixed
effects, house prices are much more responsive to cluster school test scores when
they are very close to the cluster schools, compared to when houses are far from
the cluster schools. However, when fixed effects are estimated, this pattern usually
disappears, and occasionally the reverse effect emerges, such that house prices are
most responsive to cluster school test scores when they are farthest from cluster
schools. This is true whether cluster test scores are measured as simply the average
test score of all cluster schools or a weighted average of test scores, where the weights
are the distance from each house to its cluster schools.
Theoretically, it is difficult to know what we expect to happen with respect
to cluster school test scores. The most obvious expectation is that when choice is
less accessible, parents care less about the cluster schools and more about the local
school. However, it could be the case that when choice is more accessible, parents
care less, in general, about the quality of each school. If they are close to many
schools, then one of the desirable factors of a school has been met - its proximity;
quality may then play less of a role in choosing a school.
As before, there are several difficulties arise when estimating the impact of
cluster “quality” on house prices. The question of what measure of quality to use is
not easily answered. Do parents see the quality as the average test score of the cluster
schools? Do they look at the best test score? Do they look at some combination
of test scores and distance to one’s house? The results from the previous section
indicated that parents care about both test scores and proximity. However, the
initial estimates of the relationship between cluster school test scores and proximity
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are not precise enough to let one know for sure exactly what measures of cluster
“quality” are important. This is most certainly and area where more research can
and needs to be done.
2.9 Extensions and Robustness Checks
My primary results support the hypothesis that school choice mitigates the
responsiveness of house prices to changes in local school quality. In this section, I
extend my analysis to show that my results are robust to different methodologies.
First, I examine whether my identification assumption is likely to hold.
2.9.1 Exploring Identification
My identification strategy rests on the assumption that houses that are geo-
graphically close have similar unobservable characteristics. Ultimately, my identi-
fication strategy cannot be tested. However, I can test the extent to which houses
close to a boundary have more similar observable characteristics than houses farther
away from a boundary.
What I want to test is whether houses located in a better school’s area are
observably better houses in terms of square footage, number of stories, etc. In
particular, for houses that are near a boundary and in a better school’s area, are
these houses better than houses that are near the same boundary but in the lower-
scoring school’s area? To answer this question, I first assign each house to either
the “low” or the “high” side of the boundary. A house is on the high side if its
residential-area school has higher test scores than the school on the opposite side of
the boundary16.
16I compare schools’ CTBS total scores to determine high or low status.
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I then regress each house characteristic on boundary fixed effects and a set of
distance dummy variables. Each distance dummy variable measures the distance
from the house to the boundary, in .05 mile increments. I include only houses for
which the gap between low and high is at least as large as the median gap.
Figure 5 presents the results in a series of graphs. The graphs are constructed
by plotting the coefficients on the distance dummy variables from the above regres-
sions. A negative distance means that the house is on the low side of the boundary.
The first panel presents the results for CTBS reading percentile. By construc-
tion, there should be a jump at the boundary; this jump is indeed pronounced.
The next panel presents the results for the natural log of price (inflation adjusted).
Interestingly, there is not a large jump in price at the boundary. However, prices
are on average higher on the high side of the boundary.
The remaining graphs display the coefficients on other characteristics. Notice
that the distance from the boundary is allowed to reach up to one mile. The relevant
area for my identification strategy is to compare the coefficients less than 2000 feet
(or approximately one half mile) away from the boundary. We expect to see more
of a trend as the distance gets larger.
The coefficient on acreage is very stable across boundaries. For square footage,
houses tend to to have slightly higher square footage on the high side of the bound-
ary. Stories and home age are rather variable but they appear to be reasonably
continuous on either side of the boundary.
The statistical tests for the presence of discontinuities at the boundary are
presented in Table 2.12. The tests reinforce what the graphs suggest. Test scores
and house prices change discontinuously at catchment area boundaries. However,
other home characteristics change continuously. This finding lends support to my
identification strategy. Because there are no sharp discontinuities in observable char-
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acteristics when one moves from the high side of the boundary to the low side, this
suggests that there will not be discontinuities in unobservables across the boundary.
2.9.2 Fack and Grenet (2010)
An extension of Black’s strategy was used by Fack and Grenet (2010) to es-
timate the relationship between house prices and school quality for middle school
students in Paris, France. This approach improves upon the boundary discontinuity
approach in some ways. One problem with the boundary discontinuity approach
is its inability to deal with houses that are close to the same boundary but still
geographically far apart. For instance, I restrict my sample to houses that are 2000
feet from a school assignment boundary. However, if the boundary is long, say 5,000
feet, then two houses on opposite sides of the boundary and opposite ends of the
boundary could be much more than 5,000 feet apart. In this case, the identifica-
tion assumption of the boundary fixed effect method may fail. In response to this
issue, Fack and Grenet (2010) proposed an extension of Black’s strategy. As I show,
the method used by Fack and Grenet also introduces a lot of noise into the mea-
surements. Because of this shortcoming, it is not ideal for this context, where the
estimates are already very small. Additionally, Fack and Grenet do not prove that
their estimates are consistent or that the standard errors are correct. Because of
this, one should be cautious in interpreting the results from using their method.
The method works as follows. For each house, I construct a counterfactual
sale price, which is based on home sales that occurred near the home of interest but
on the opposite side of the boundary. The difference in price between the sale of
interest and the counterfactual sale is the dependent variable.
To be more specific, the counterfactual price is a weighted average of the sale
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price of houses located within a specified radius (2000 feet) of the house of interest,
but on the opposite side of the school boundary. The weights are the inverse of the
distance from the house of interest to each house included in the counterfactual sale










where di,j is the distance from house i, the house of interest, to house j on the
opposite side of the boundary. Figure 6 compares the process for selecting houses
for this procedure compared to the boundary fixed affects approach. With this
method, I draw a circle of radius 2000 feet around a house that is within 2000 feet
of the boundary. The houses that fall into this circle and are on the opposite side
of the boundary will be used to construct the counterfactual sale.
The regression equation is then as follows:
ln pricei,s,b,t−ln pricei′,s′,b,t = β(Qualitys,t−Qualitys′,t)+(Xi−Xi′)δ+(εi,s,t−εi′,s′,t)
17
(2.8)
I estimate this equation using OLS. My identifying assumption is that neigh-
borhood characteristics change continuously over space, while school quality changes
discontinuously. Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
The results of this procedure are presented in Table 2.13. Column 1 displays
the coefficient estimates from estimating equation (6) without control variables.
Column 2 includes these controls. One can compare column 2 to the estimates in
column 4 of Table 2.3. The results are very similar. The coefficient estimates from
17I contruct counterfactual house characteristics the same way that I construct counterfactual
sales. This differs from Fack and Grenet, who use regression-adjusted house prices to construct
the counterfactual house prices. This eliminates the need for house characteristics in the main
estimating equation. However, it introduces more measurement error.
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the current method are slightly larger than those from the boundary fixed effects
approach. Columns 3 and 4 include estimates of the effect of cluster school quality
on house prices. The estimates are slightly smaller than those obtained from the
boundary fixed effects approach, but they are qualitatively similar.
2.9.3 Other Extensions
As an additional robustness check, I utilize the approach of Bayer, Ferreira,
and McMillan (2007). They show that the inclusion of both boundary fixed effects
and neighborhood characteristics drives the coefficient on local school quality down
even further. Though they are ultimately able to make use of restricted Census data
in much of their analysis, they also estimate a boundary fixed effects regression with
Census block-group level neighborhood characteristics. The characteristics used are
percent of block group that is black, percent of block group with at least a college
degree, and the average block group income.
There are 556 Census block groups in Jefferson County. I assign a house
to a block group by matching the geocoded house addresses to Census shapefiles.
There will naturally be some measurement error in the neighborhood characteristics.
Sometimes houses that share a boundary will be in the same block group. Other
times they will be in different block groups. There may be several block groups per
boundary. However, I follow Bayer et al. (2007) as closely as possible and compare
my results.
The results are presented in Table 2.14. One of the findings of Bayer et al.
is that the inclusion of neighborhood characteristics in addition to boundary fixed
effects causes the estimate of the house price premium for school quality to fall
by about fifty percent. Column 2 presents my results with boundary fixed effects
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but without neighborhood characteristics. Column 4 presents results with both
boundary fixed effects and neighborhood characteristics. Consistent with Bayer et.
al., the coefficient on local school quality does fall. It does not fall by fifty percent,
only by about twenty. However, this is a decline from an already small coefficient.
This finding lends more support to their conclusions that the boundary fixed effects
approach does not fully account for unobserved neighborhood characteristics. In
this research, it further supports the hypothesis that school choice mitigates the
impact of local school quality changes on house prices. With a mean test score of
fifty, a five percent increase in test scores implies an increase in house prices of less
than two-tenths of a percent.
2.10 Conclusion
In this chapter, I investigate the relationship between school quality and house
prices in the context of intradistrict school choice. I find that the estimated impact
of local school quality on house prices is much smaller than what has been estimated
in school districts without school choice. The literature has found that a five percent
increase in local school quality leads to a one to three percent increase in house prices.
I estimate that a five percent increase in the local school’s test score percentile would
lead to between one and three tenths of a percent increase in house prices.
This effect is primarily observed in houses that have the least opportunities to
exercise choice in this school district. Using the distance to cluster schools as a way
to measure school choice accessibility, I find that as the proximity to cluster schools
increases, the house price premium for local school quality declines. For houses that
are, on average, close to their cluster schools, the coefficient on local school quality
is up to four times smaller than the coefficient on local school quality for houses
43
farthest from their cluster school.
Additionally, as the proximity to cluster schools increases, the house price
premium for cluster school quality increases. Together with the previous result, this
finding is consistent with previous research that finds that parents care about the
distance between their house and their child’s school.
Overall, this chapter shows that, under school choice, the impact of local school
quality on house prices is smaller. I also show that parents prefer high scoring schools
and schools that are close to their home. Further exploration using parents’ choice
applications in addition to the empirical approach used here could shed more light
on the impact of school choice on parents’ preferences.
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Table 2.1: House Summary Statistics
All <2000ft High Low
Houses From Boundary Side Side
Price $152,112 $144,547 $148,793 $140,430
(90,204) (79,820) (82,100) (77,325)
Sq. Footage 1,465 1,428 1,457 1,400
(615.7) (579.8) (595.9) (562.4)
Stories 1.323 1.320 1.324 1.316
(0.386) (0.383) (0.393) (0.373)
Acreage 0.249 0.235 0.236 0.235
(0.343) (0.259) (0.235) (0.279)
Home Age 43.38 44.24 42.93 45.52
(24.51) (24.75) (24.49) (24.93)
Assessed Value 151,653 143,403 147,811 139,129
(94,316) (84,214) (87,153) (81,037)
No. Bathrooms 1.723 1.682 1.717 1.649
(0.740) (0.718) (0.725) (0.710)
Air Conditioning 0.894 0.884 0.892 0.875
(0.308) (0.321) (0.310) (0.330)
Attached Garage 0.267 0.254 0.266 0.242
(0.442) (0.435) (0.442) (0.428)
Detached Garage 0.365 0.374 0.369 0.379
(0.482) (0.484) (0.483) (0.485)
Garage Sq. Footage 290.4 284.7 289.9 279.6
(274.7) (270.2) (270.2) (270.1)
Basement 0.623 0.615 0.621 0.610
(0.485) (0.487) (0.485) (0.488)
% of Students in Catchment
Area Attending:
Local School 0.696 0.696 0.694 0.699
(0.129) (0.133) (0.133) (0.133)
#1 School 0.0514 0.0531 0.0482 0.0578
(0.0563) (0.0568) (0.0517) (0.0609)
#2 School 0.0427 0.0435 0.0399 0.0469
(0.0499) (0.0501) (0.0461) (0.0535)
#3 School 0.0454 0.0464 0.0477 0.0452
(0.0531) (0.0535) (0.0527) (0.0543)
Distance (in 1,000’s of feet) to:
Local School 0.900 0.927 0.957 0.898
(0.618) (0.594) (0.608) (0.578)
#1 Cluster School 5.570 5.479 5.594 5.368
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(3.164) (3.155) (3.132) (3.174)
#2 Cluster School 5.482 5.377 5.325 5.428
(2.997) (2.983) (2.847) (3.109)
#3 Cluster School 5.618 5.574 5.521 5.625
(3.162) (3.176) (3.191) (3.161)
Closest Cluster School 2.366 2.327 2.288 2.364
(1.509) (1.526) (1.411) (1.628)
2nd Closest Cluster School 3.692 3.624 3.516 3.728
(1.850) (1.833) (1.692) (1.954)
3rd Closest Cluster School 5.261 5.228 5.069 5.383
(2.384) (2.378) (2.280) (2.459)

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.6: Estimates of the Importance of Proximity, Cluster Schools Ranked by Test Scores
(1) (2) (3)
Local Composite Test Score 0.00268*** 0.00330*** 0.00247***
(0.00023) (0.00048) (0.00055)
Distance to Local School -0.00331* 0.00433 0.00521
(0.00171) (0.00572) (0.00581)
Local Composite Test Score × Distance -0.00014 -0.00015
(0.00009) (0.00009)
Composite Test Score (#1 Cluster School) 0.00102**
(0.00041)
Composite Test Score (#2 Cluster School) 0.00070
(0.00075)
Composite Test Score (#3 Cluster School) 0.00025
(0.00058)
Distance to #1 Cluster School -0.00064
(0.00083)
Distance to #2 Cluster School 0.00000
(0.00079)
Distance to #3 Cluster School -0.00074
(0.00058)
Cluster Comp. Test Score × Dist. (#1 School) 0.00001
(0.00001)
Cluster Comp. Test Score × Dist. (#2 School) 0.00000
(0.00001)
Cluster Comp. Test Score × Dist. (#3 School) 0.00002
(0.00001)
(1) Clustered standard errors in parentheses
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(3) All columns include controls for house characteristics and year effects.
(4) All columns include boundary fixed effects.
(5) Sample is restricted to houses within 2000ft of a catchment area boundary.
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Table 2.7: Estimates of the Importance of Proximity, Cluster Schools Ranked by Distance
(1) (2) (3)
Local Composite Test Score 0.00268*** 0.00330*** 0.00327***
(0.00023) (0.00048) (0.00049)
Distance to Local School -0.00331* 0.00433 0.00722
(0.00171) (0.00572) (0.00554)
Local Composite Test Score × Distance -0.00014 -0.00019**
(0.00009) (0.00009)
Composite Test Score 0.00129***
(Closest Cluster School) (0.00040)
Composite Test Score 0.00145***
(2nd Closest Cluster School) (0.00050)
Composite Test Score -0.00188***
(3rd Closest Cluster School) (0.00056)
Distance to Closest Cluster School -0.00025
(0.00169)
Distance to 2nd Closest Cluster School 0.00147
(0.00151)
Distance to 3rd Closest Cluster School -0.00316***
(0.00097)
Cluster Comp. Test Score × 0.00000
Distance (Closest School) (0.00003)
Cluster Comp. Test Score × -0.00001
Distance (2nd Closest School) (0.00003)
Cluster Comp. Test Score × 0.00007***
Distance (3rd Closest School) (0.00002)
(1) Clustered standard errors in parentheses
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(3) All columns include controls for house characteristics and year effects.






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.12: Testing the Difference in Means Across Boundaries
High Test Low Test Test of
Score Side Score Side Difference Difference
Mean Mean in Means t-statistic
Local School Test Score 60.71 43.63 17.08 14.84
Price 148,793 140,430 8,363 3.13
Sq. Footage 1,457 1,400 57 1.58
Stories 1.324 1.316 0.008 1.69
Acreage 0.236 0.235 0.001 -0.44
Home Age 42.93 45.52 -2.59 -0.95
(1) Column 4 reports the t-statistic for a test of the hypothesis that the mean of the house
characteristic does not vary across school catchment area boundaries. The test conditions on
boundary fixed effects and adjusts for clustering at the catchment area level.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.1: JCPS Clusters 1 - 6
Cluster
1 2 3 4 5 6
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Figure 2.3: Assignment of Clusters
A
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Figure 2.4: Selecting Houses within 2000 Feet of a Boundary
Capture Area using Black Method
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Figure 2.6: Selecting Houses to Create a Counterfactual Sale
Capture Area using Fack and Grenet
Capture Area using Black Method
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Chapter 3: Do Music Classes Lead to Improved Student Outcomes?
3.1 Introduction
In recent years, with many school districts facing sharp budget cuts, the impor-
tance of music education has been hotly debated. Often, music education is one of
the first place schools districts look to make cuts in expenses. However, many argue
that music has an important place in our children’s education. Some contend that
participation in music can lead to improved academic achievement. This paper in-
vestigates the relationship between high school music participation and educational
outcomes. Specifically, I examine whether participation in high school music classes
affects high school graduation, college attendance, high school GPA, SAT scores,
and ACT scores. The results suggest that participating in music classes improves
student outcomes along all of these dimensions. The largest effects are found for
students who participate in band.
Theoretically, participation in high school band or chorus could have positive
or negative effects on student outcomes. It is possible that, in the absence of music
classes, students would be taking more math, science, or other academic courses. If
more of these courses lead to improved academic acheivement, then music classes
could distract students from more important subjects and consequently lowering
their outcomes.
Other the other hand, music may promote creativity, work ethic, and abstract
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thinking. To the extent that these qualities lead to improved academic outcomes,
then students who take music classes may be more likely than their non-music peers
to graduate from high school and to attend college. Additionally, music classes
could expose some students to high-achieving peers whom they otherwise might not
interact with. If having friends who go to college increases one’s own likelihood
of attending college, then participating in music classes could improve outcomes
through peer effects.
A variety of research examines the impact of music on academic achievement.
Perhaps the most well-known is that which documents the “Mozart effect” (Rauscher
and Ky, 1994). The authors find that after listening to a Mozart sonata for ten
minutes, college students perform better on a spatial reasoning test. However, the
students do not perform significantly better on any of the other tests administered
during the experience. Additionally, despite many attempts to replicate these re-
sults, most studies are unable to find a significant effect of listening Mozart on more
than one specific spatial reasoning test (see Steele et al. (1999) for a meta-analysis).
In another experiment, Rauscher et al. (1997) find that children who received piano
lessons scored significantly higher than the non-music group on an object assembly
task.
Many other researchers have documented a positive correlation between par-
ticipation in music and academic achievement. However, there is a strong possibility
that this correlation is driven by selection into music. Music lessons are costly, and
students from poor families often cannot afford these lessons. In general, students
who participate in music tend to come from families at a higher socio-economic sta-
tus (Elpus and Abril, 2011; Kinney, 2010). Because students from affluent families
are also more likely to attend college or to receive higher test scores, a positive cor-
relation between music participation and academic achievement does not necessarily
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imply a causal relationship.
To my knowledge, there has been no research on the relationship between music
participation and academic achievement in the economics literature. In general,
there is a very small literature that estimates the causal impact of music classes on
academic achievement. I investigate the impact of music participation on student
outcomes using both OLS with school fixed effects and propensity score matching.
There are advantages and disadvantages to both strategies. One strength of
OLS is that I can estimate school fixed effects using this method, while propensity
score matching cannot accommodate fixed effects. By estimating school fixed effects,
I can control for the effect of each school on students’ academic outcomes. However,
one disadvantage of OLS is that it compares treated observations to the average of
all untreated observations (or, to untreated individuals within the same school in the
case of school fixed effects). Therefore, one might be hesitant to conclude that OLS
is estimating a causal relationship. The advantage of propensity score matching
over OLS is that matching will match treated students with only the comparison
students who share propensity scores.
Additionally, one should be cautious when comparing the OLS with school
fixed effects results to the propensity score matching results. OLS without school
fixed effects restricts the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) to be equal
to the average treatment effect (ATE). In this case, the ATT is the average treatment
effect of music courses on students who take music courses. Though it is not obvious
whether OLS with school fixed effects still restricts ATT to be equal to ATE, OLS
estimates the ATE and one must assume that the ATT is equal to the ATE in order
to recover the ATT. Propensity score matching directly estimates the ATT. If the
ATT is not equal to the ATE when using OLS with fixed effects, then the propensity
score matching effects and OLS effects may not be comparable.
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My primary outcome measures are whether the student graduates from high
school, whether the student attends college, academic GPA, SAT score, and ACT
score. Then, using college attendance as an example, the ATT is the difference in
college attendance of a student who participates in a high school music class and
what that student’s likelihood of college attendance would have been if he or she
had not participated in a high school music class.
In the next section, I describe the related literature. Section 3.3 describes
the Data. Section 3.4 will present my empirical strategy. Section 3.5 discusses my
results, and in Section 3.6, I conclude.
3.2 Literature
Though the relationship between music and academic achievement has not
received much attention in the economics literature, it has not been ignored in other
fields. Among the supporters of the music, there are two major lines of reasoning
for why music education is important. The first group argues that music helps
students become better at other subjects like reading and math. The second group
argues that, whether or not music leads to improved perfomance in other academic
subjects, music is important as its own subject. They argue that music is not to be
justified by what it can do for reading and mathematics; instead, music education
is justified by teaching what no other subject can teach. See Mark (2002, 2005) for
a discussion of music education advocacy in the United States.
It is important to think about these two claims when researching this area. If
music is not found to improve academic achievement, would this imply that music
classes are not worthwhile? Furthermore, there is still a debate over what consti-
tutes academic acheivement. I have carefully considered the dependent variables
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of interest for this paper with these claims in mind. When evaluating education
programs, a common outcome variable is a student’s test score.
The College Board in 2010 reported that students who take four years of arts
and music classes while in high school score 102 points higher on the SAT than their
non-music counterparts (Americans for the Arts, 2010). Elpus (2013) estimates the
impact of high school music classes on SAT scores using ordinary least squares with
school fixed effects. He finds that music classes have no impact on SAT scores.1
Following this line of research, I estimate the impact of music participation on SAT
scores, ACT scores, and students’ academic GPA. But, even if music classes do not
improve test scores, the question of whether music classes are important to education
is still unanswered.
It is still unclear to researchers what some test scores are actually measuring.
Whether they are a good measure of achievement is debatable. However, what
economists and policy-makers generally agree on is that a desirable goal for all young
adults is to increase educational attainment. Completion of high school improves
labor market and earning opportunities in individuals’ adult lives. Completion of
college further improves these outcomes (Card, 1999). For these reasons, I also
test whether participation in high school music classes leads to fewer high school
dropouts and increases in matriculation to college.
There is a vast literature outside of economics supporting a positive rela-
tionship between music and several different academic outcomes. However, the
extent to which studies are able to identify a causal relationship and not just a
correlation varies dramatically (Babo, 2004; Cheek and Smith, 1999; Costa-Giomi,
1One should note that some of Elpus’s control variables are likely to be endogenous. In par-
ticular, he defines treatment as taking a music class during any year of high school. However, the
control variables for prior academic achievement are measured in 9th and tenth grade, meaning
they could be affected by music participation. He also includes the amount of time spent watching
TV and playing video games each week.
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2004; Graziano et al., 1999; Helmrich, 2010; Legg, 2009; Schellenberg, 2004, 2006).
Many researchers have noted that the positive relationship between music and aca-
demic achievement may be caused by selection bias (Kinney, 2008, 2010; Winner and
Cooper, 2000). These researchers show that there are many systematic differences
between music and non-music students prior to the students’ participation in music
classes. For example, students who select into music classes are more likely to be
from wealthier families. They are also more likely to be from two-parent homes.
Studies that do not account for these differences will suffer from selection bias.
The first research that, to my knowledge, uses econometric techniques to es-
timate a causal relationship is Elpus (2013). Elpus estimates the impact of partici-
pation in high school music classes on SAT scores using a regression approach with
school fixed effects. He finds no effect of music classes as a whole on SAT scores.
However, he does find a small effect of participation in band on SAT scores. I use
this paper as a model for my own research. Like Elpus, I use the Education Longi-
tudinal Survey of 2002. I also begin my analysis with a regression approach using
school fixed effects. I extend Elpus’s research by examining additional dependent
variables, including college attendance, academic GPA, ACT scores, and high school
completion. I additionally modify his empirical strategy by eliminating some of his
control variables which are likey to be endogenous. Specifically, I eliminate tenth
grade test scores as a control variable, because this is observed post-baseline. I also
eliminate variables that indicate how many hours each week are spent watching TV,
playing video games, or working.
I further extend the literature by using propensity score matching. Propensity
score matching can be used to correct for selection bias, making it well-suited for
answering this question. As compared to OLS with school fixed effects, propensity
score matching has a less restrictive functional form. However, it must also satisfy
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several of its own strict assumptions. I will discuss these strengths and limitations
in section 3.4. In the next section, I describe the data used for this study.
3.3 Data
The data for this research come from the Education Longitudinal Study of
2002 (ELS 2002). The purpose of the survey was to monitor the transition of a
national sample of high school student as they progressed from tenth grade through
high school and on to postsecondary school and/or work. It is a longitudinal study
that follows the same students throughout their high school career and beyond.
Approximately 15,000 tenth grade students from 750 schools across the United
States were surveyed in 2002. In the baseline survey, students were tested in reading
and mathematics to provide a baseline achievement level. Students were also asked
a variety of questions about their attitudes and experiences, such as their attitude
toward school, whether they participated in extra-curricular activites, how much
time they spend on homework, whether they had taken an Advanced Placement
course, etc.
Students were surveyed again in 2004 and 2006. In the 2004 survey, infor-
mation was gathered about colleges applied to, whether the student enrolled in a
postsecondary school, and whether the student completed high school. Students
were also asked about their employment and earnings. This survey provides the
outcome measures for my analysis. My main outcomes of interest are whether the
student completed high school, whether the student ever attended college, SAT
score, ACT score, and four-year academic GPA.
In addition to the student information, parents were also surveyed in the base
year to obtain additional information. I have information about mother’s education,
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father’s education, family income, family structure, socio-economic status, and a
variety of other variables from the parent survey.
I also have access to students’ transcript information, which lists every course
in which the student was enrolled and the student’s grade in the course. I make use
of the transcript data in order to identify which students are music students. I use
several definitions for a music student. The most general definition identifies music
students as those students who earned credit for one or more music courses during
high school. However, one may argue that the baseline controls variables could
coincide with treatment if this definition is used. If a student participates in music
in the 9th grade, then some control variables would not truly be “pre-treatment”
variables. In order to ensure that all control variables are observed pre-treatment, I
define treatment as participating in music in 10th, 11th, or 12th grade.
Unfortunately, this definition creates another difficulty. Defining treatment as
participation in a music class in 10th, 11th, or 12th grades opens the possibility
that students who took music classes in 9th grade will be in the comparison group.
However, this definition is better than the alternative, because I am not explicitly
using concurrently observed treatment and control variables. Additionally, while
having 9th grade music students in the comparison group is not ideal, this should
bias the estimates downward, which isn’t a large concern. Selection bias should lead
to estimates that are biased upward, so it is not too concerning to have a factor that
biases the estimates downward.
An alternative to including 9th grade music students in the comparison group
is to drop these students from the sample. I will do this in section 3.6. However, as
I will show, it is not the ideal way to define the treatment and comparison groups.
The inability to obtain clearly defined treatment and control groups is certainly
a drawback of this research. While the ELS data contain a great deal of information,
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surveys such as this could be improved by asking questions about past achievement
and activities. A richer set of baseline variables could improve causal estimates.
However, even with the addition of richer baseline variables, there would likely still
be concerns about estimating a causal effect. If high school music affects academic
achievement, then it’s possible that elementary and middle school music also affects
academic achievement. If this is true, then this creates the possibility that OLS has
omitted variable bias and that the conditional independenc assumption is violated
in propensity score matching. Unfortunately, these are not things I can test for
with the data available. But it is something to keep in mind when interpreting the
results.
In addition to estimating the effect of music participation on academic out-
comes, I also separately estimate the effect of band or choir on academic outcomes.
Elpus (2013) found different effects of music classes on SAT scores for band students
versus choir students, and so I continue to extend his research by estimating the
impact of band and choir on several additional outcomes. One might expect to see
different results for band versus choir students. Band students are required to read
music, whereas not all choir students need to have this skill. If reading music is sim-
ilar to learning a language, then having this ability might cause the band students
to think differently.
I make use of one final definition of a music student in this research. I examine
students who earned one or more credits of music in 10th, 11th, or 12th grade. I
use this definition of music to investigate whether the impact of music is primarily
through students who take many music classes or if the effect is present for students
who take any music classes.
In order to define music in so many different ways, I had to very carefully
examine the ELS transcript data. With the help of an expert in both music edu-
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cation and the ELS 2002 data, I reviewed the transcript data to ensure that the
information was properly coded. First, any courses coded as arts courses were re-
viewed to ensure that no music courses were incorrectly listed as a visual art, dance,
or theater class. Second, within the music classes, each course had to be properly
identified as a band, chorus, or “other music” course. Other music includes music
theory, piano courses, general music courses, etc. See Elpus (2013) for a full review
of the transcript data cleaning process.
3.3.1 Summary Statistics
Table 3.1 displays summary statistics from the data. Column 1 shows summary
statistics for all students. Column 2 contains students who enrolled in at least one
music class during any grade in high school, and column 3 shows student who did not
participate in a music class. The music indicator is broken down into type of music
student. I examine band students, choir students, students who earned more than
1 credit of music, and students who participated in music in at least the 10th, 11th,
or 12th grade. Approximately thirty-two percent of students participated in at least
one music class during high school. Elevent percent of students participate in band,
and sixteen percent of students participate in chorus. Of the music students, only
about half earn at least one full credit of music. Eighty percent of music students
take at least one music class in 10th, 11th, or 12th grade.
Comparing columns 2 and 3, one can see that students who participated in
music are more likely to attend college and more likely to attend a four-year college.
Music students are less likely to drop out of high school. These students are also
more likely to have received an academic honor and are less likely to have taken
a remedial math or reading class. The music students’ parents are more educated,
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have a higher family income, and are more likely to participate in a parent-teacher
organization.
When one compares the characteristics of schools that music students attend,
one sees that music students are more likely to attend a private school than a public
school. They are also more likely to attend urban schools than rural or suburban
schools.
The summary statistics are consistent with the patterns that exist in the liter-
ature. We see that music students are more likely to have higher academic achieve-
ment. However, given their advantage in socio-economic status and other areas,
a careful analysis is required to determine whether there is a causal relationship
between music participation and student outcomes. The next section describes my
empirical approach for testing this relationship.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
I use propensity score matching to estimate the impact of high school band or
chorus participation on student outcomes.
Define treatment as participation in a music class at the baseline. Let Mi=1
if a student is in the treatment group and 0 otherwise. Let Yi represent the student
outcome of interest. For ease of exposition, I consider dropping out of high school to
be the main outcome of interest when I discuss the empirical methodology. Yi,1 indi-
cates whether student i dropped out of high school and received treatment, and Yi,0
indicates whether she dropped out of high school and she did not receive treatment.
I estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). While the average
treatment effect (ATE) may be interesting, it represents the effect of treatment on
an individual drawn randomly from the sample and is not easily estimated. The
83
goal of this paper is not to say what would occur if all students were to take a music
class. Instead, I am interested in the effect of music classes on those students who
take them. Thus, the ATT is more suitable. The ATT can be expressed as follows:
ATT = E[Yi,1 − Yi,0|Mi = 1] = E[Yi,1|Mi = 1]− E[Yi,0|Mi = 1]. (3.1)
The right-hand side of equation (3.1) is the difference between whether a student
drops out of high school if she participates in a high school music class and whether
she drops out of high school if she does not participate in a high school music class.
The first term, E[Yi,1|Mi = 1], can be obtained from the data. However, the
second term, E[Yi,0|Mi = 1], is not observable. This term represents whether the
student would have dropped out of high school if we could go back in time and have
her not participate in a music class. Though we cannot observe this term, matching
allows me to estimate the term using the outcomes of students in the sample who did
not participate in music classes. In essence, I match treated individuals to untreated
individuals who are very similar on observable characteristics. Once individuals are
matched, the students in the comparison group are as similar as possible to the
treated group along observable characteristics, and treatment can be considered
a random event. This requires that the conditional independence assumption be
satisfied, which I explain in Section 3.4.1.
In practice, matching individuals based on observable characteristics can be
problematic when there are a large number of characteristics on which to match.
In order to match individuals, I would divide the data into subgroups based on
observed characteristics. Each subgroup containing a treated individual would also
need to contain an untreated individual. As the number of variables increases, the
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number of subgroups increases, and it becomes increasingly difficult to find match
for each of the treated individuals.
To overcome this problem, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) introduced the propen-
sity score. The propensity score, p(Z), is defined as the conditional probability of
treatment given a vector of observable characteristics, Z:
p(Z) = Prob(Mi = 1|Z)
.
The basic strategy of propensity score matching is to match individuals based on
their propensity score, rather than on their observed characteristics. In this way,
the dimensionality problem can be reduced to a single index.
Rosenbaum and Rubin show that, if Yi,0 is independent of treatment status
given Z, then Yi,0 is also independent of treatment status given p(Z) = Prob(Mi =
1|Z). As a result, matching can be performed on a single index p(Z) instead of on
all of the variable in Z.
3.4.1 Propensity Score Matching Methodology
3.4.2 Identification
Two identification assumptions are used for matching. The first is the con-
ditional independence assumption (CIA). This assumption states that, conditional
on observable characteristics, Z, the distribution of the outcome variable of interest
for the treated group in the absence of treatment is the same as the distribution of




Given the previous Rosenbaum and Rubin result, the CIA can be rewritten as
Yi,0 ⊥Mi|p(Z).
The conditional independence assumption allows the counterfactual outcome for
the treatment group to be inferred from the outcomes of the comparison group, and
then any differences between the two groups can be attributed to treatment. For
this assumption to be plausible, one must have available a large amount of variables
that affect both treatment and the outcome variable. The ELS 2002 contains many
variables that determine whether students participates in high school music classes,
whether they graduate from high school, whether they attend college, and their test
scores. This richness makes it well-suited for using matching techniques.
The second identification assumption is the common support condition. This
condition states that there must be substantial overlap between the treatment and
comparison group in the value of the propensity score. If, for example, the treat-
ment group is very likely to receive treatment, then there may not be an adequate
comparison group for the treated group. For estimating the ATT, I need a positive
probability of observing untreated individuals at each value of Z, P (M = 1|Z) < 1.
If P (M = 1|Z = z0) = 1, then at Z = z0, I would observe only treated individu-
als. Because there are many students who do not participate in high school music
classes, the common support condition is not an issue in this context.
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3.4.3 Implementation
To implement propensity score matching, I break the process down into two
steps. The first step is to estimate the propensity score. I estimate the propensity
score using a probit model. I select the conditioning variables to control for factors
expected to affect both the decision to participate in high school band or chorus and
whether the student graduates from high school and attends college.
The propensity score specification varies slightly, depending on the definition of
treatment, so that the balancing test (which I will describe in detail later) is satisfied.
In general, the specification will include age, race, gender, whether the student had a
computer at home, the region in which the school is located (Northeast, South, West,
or Midwest), and the student’s 9th grade GPA. I also include characteristics of the
student’s family, such as the mother’s education, father’s education, family income,
and family’s socio-economic status. Additionally, I include several characteristics of
the student’s school. These include whether the school is public or private; whether
the school is urban, suburban, or rural; the percent of teachers who are certified to
teach in their field; the percentage of students who receive free or reduced lunch;
and the percentage of student who have limited English proficiency.
The next step in the estimation procedure is to match individuals based on
their propensity score and estimate the ATT. Applied economists have used many
different matching estimators. The choice of a matching estimators determines
two factors. It determines how an individual is matched to a group of comparison
individuals. It also determines the weighting approach for how the weighted outcome
of the comparison group will be computed and then assigned to a treated individual.















where pi is the treated individual’s propensity score, pj is a comparison individual’s
propensity score, K() is the kernel used, and h is the bandwidth. Treated individ-
uals are matched only with comparison individuals where pi − pj falls within this
bandwidth. Then, within the bandwidth, comparison individuals whose propen-
sity score is closer to that of a treated individual will receive higher weight. I use
the Epanechikov kernel in the matching procedure. The bandwidth is 0.1.2 After
matching the individuals, the estimates of ŷi will be used to estimate the effect of
high school band or chorus on student outcomes.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 OLS Model
I begin by presenting results of an Ordinary Least Squares regression of the
outcome variables of interest on a student’s participation in high school music classes
in 10th, 11th, or 12th grade. The regression takes the form
Yi = βMi + δZiδ + εi, (3.2)
where Mi is a dummy variable that indicates whether the student participated in a
high school music class in 10th, 11th, or 12th grade, Zi is a matrix of individual and
family characteristics, and Yi is a dummy outcome variable. For high school drop
2I estimated the results using bandwidths varying from 0.05 to 0.15, and the results were not
sensitive to choice of bandwidth.
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outs, Yi is 1 if the student dropped out of high school and 0 otherwise.
3 For college
attendance, Yi is 1 if the student ever attended college and 0 otherwise. Other
dependent variables include the student’s SAT score, ACT score, and academic
GPA.
Table 3.2 displays the results from estimating equation (3.2). Panel A displays
a baseline estimation of the effect of music classes in 10th, 11th, or 12th grade
on various outcome variables; no control variables are included in Panel A. Panel
B esimates this relationship controlling for individuals and family characteristics.
Panel C includes controls for 9th grade GPA in addition to individual and family
characteristics. Panel D further adds school fixed effects. Panel E is the same
as Panel D, except that school characteristics are included as control variables in
place of the school fixed effects. Propensity score matching will not allow for school
fixed effects due to dimensionality constraints. Instead, I can only include school
characteristics. Panel E should be compared to Panel D to see how the estimates
differ when school characteristics are used as control variables in place of school
fixed effects.
Finally, Panel F includes control variables for hours spent watching televi-
sion or playing video games each week. This panel is included as a comparison
to Elpus (2013)’s research. In his regression, his preferred estimates include these
additional variables. Though these variables are likely endogenous, I include them
as a comparison to his previous work.
For all estimates, standard errors are clustered at the school level. Each cell
in the table represents a separate regression.
3One may be concerned about using dropping out as an outcome variable if many students
are dropping out of high school very early on. Fortunately, only approximately fifteen percent of
students who drop out are doing so prior to their junior year. I will eliminate from my sample
those students who drop out prior to 11th grade. This eliminates 130 students.
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The outcome variables are whether the student drops out of high school,
whether the student attends a post-secondary institution, whether the student at-
tends a four-year college, the student’s SAT score, the student’s ACT score, and
the student’s academic GPA. The academic GPA is defined as the students GPA
in only academic courses. Thus, grades in music classes and/or other non-academic
courses have been removed from the calculation.
Panel A shows a strong correlation between participating in high school music
classes and all of the outcome variables. Student who participate in music are eleven
percentage points more likely to attend college. Students who take music classes
are approximately four percentage points less likely to drop out of high school. The
correlation is strongest for band students and for students who earned at least one
full music credit.
In Panel B, when individual and family control variables are included, the
magnitudes of the coefficients decrease. In Panel C, when control for 9th grade
GPA is included, the magnitudes of the coefficients decline dramatically. Most
of the coefficients are at least five times smaller than in the baseline estimation.
These results are all consistent with the idea that the correlation between music
and academic achievement is driven partly by selection.
Panel D builds off of Panel C by additionally estimating school fixed effects.
This panel contains my preferred OLS specification. This panel contains the richest
set of controls without including potentially endogenous variables. Additionally, the
school fixed effects should control for the effect of a student’s school on both music
participation and academic achievement. The coefficient on music participation is
smaller for nearly every definition of music student and for nearly every outcome
variable than in the baseline correlation. The results indicate that participating in
music increases the likelihood of attending a postsecondary institution and improves
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academic GPA. Music classes also appear to affect whether a student will drop out
of high school. Based on the averages of the variables, the results suggest that
taking a music class leads to a four percent increase in attending a postsecondary
institution and improve academic GPA by two percent.
The relationship between music and academic achievement is strongest for
band students. The results indicate that participating in band increases the likeli-
hood of attending a postsecondary school by six percent and increases the likelihood
of attending a four-year college by seven percent. Band students also see increases
in both SAT and ACT scores of approximately two percent.
Panel E replaces the school fixed effects in Panel D with school characteristics.
These variables are whether the school is public or private; whether the school is
urban, suburban, or rural; the percent of teachers who are certified to teach in their
field; the percentage of students who receive free or reduced lunch; and the per-
centage of student who have limited English proficiency. Although in theory, these
characteristics can vary over time, in practice they do not vary enough to be in-
cluded in the regression along with school fixed effects. Therefore, a regression with
school fixed effects does a better job than a regression with this set of school charac-
teristics at capturing variation across schools in factors that may affect achievement
and that are correlated with taking music classes. But because I am not able to es-
timate school fixed effects with the propensity score matching approach, it is useful
to explore the differences that arise when school characteristics are included in the
regression in place of school fixed effects.
Overall, the estimates that use school characteristics as controls are fairly
similar to the estimates that arise from using school fixed effects. The most simi-
lar estimates are those where the dependent variable is attending a postsecondary
institution, attending a four-year college, and academic GPA. When the dependent
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variable is dropping out, the estimates with school fixed effects are slightly larger,
though the estimates that use school characteristics are generally not statistically
significant. The most notable discrepancy between the estimates is in the estimated
effect of music on ACT and SAT scores. Without school fixed effects, the estimated
treatment effects are much larger than when these effects are estimated with school
fixed effects. Because of this discrepancy, I am cautious in concluding that propen-
sity score matching is truly estimating the causal impact of music classes on ACT
or SAT scores.
Panel F further includes time-use control variables, which are hours per week
spent watching television and hours per week spent playing video games. Though
these variables are likely endogenous, I have included them because they are used
in the research done by Elpus (2013). The specification used in Panel E is nearly
identical to that used by Elpus. His only outcome variable is SAT score, and my
results are very similar to his results when SAT score is the dependent variable.
Whether these variables are endogenous or not, they have little impact on the results.
I exclude these controls from future regressions.
Though I have included many control variables and a full set of school fixed
effects, one might still be wary of the results. Based on the summary statistics,
we know that students who participate in high school music also tend to be from
more educated and more affluent families. Since students who participate in music
differ from non-music students along observable characteristics, it is also likely that
they differ along unobservable characteristics. OLS is restrictive in its functional
form and, without fixed effects, requires that the Average Treatment Effect on the
Treated be equal to the Average Treatment Effect. Because I am estimating school
fixed effects, it is not clear exactly what treatment effect is being estimated and if
ATT is still equal to ATE in this case. In order to address these restrictions, I now
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use a different method of estimating the causal effect of music classes on academic
achievement. The next section discusses the results of propensity score matching.
3.5.2 Propensity Score Matching Results
The first step of propensity score matching is to estimate the propensity score.
Table 3.3 presents the probit marginal effects estimates of the propensity score for
each definition of music student. Compared to non-music students, music students
are more likely to be female, more likely to be black, have a higher 9th grade
standardized test score, and are more likely to live in a two-parent home. In addition,
music students’ parents are more educated, though they are not likely to have a
higher income.
Among students who did not participate in music, some have a predicted
probability of participating in music that is lower than the predicted probability
of music participationg among students in the treatment group. I enforce common
support by excluding students with propensity scores lower than the minimum of
the treatment group. This excludes approximately 40-50 students, depending on
the definition of music student. I also exclude students who attend a school that
does not offer music classes.
Tables 3.4 through 3.6 present results of the balancing test of the hypothe-
sis that the mean of each variable is equal between the treatment and comparison
groups. The definition of treatment is different in each table. The balancing test
ensures that, on average, students in each group have similar observable character-
istics. For all variables, the results of a paired t-test indicate that the means of each
variable for the treatment and comparison groups are not statistically different. The
balancing condition is safisfied for all definitions of music student.
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Table 3.7 displays the results of the propensity score matching estimates of
the effect of 10th, 11th, or 12th grade music participation (also sub-divided into
band or choir participation) on six measures of academic achievement. Each cell
in the table represents a separate estimation procedure. Thus, cell one shows the
estimate of the impact of taking at least one music class on whether a student
drops out of high school. Refer to Table 3.3 to see the full list of covariates for
each specification. Standard errors are block bootstrapped by school using 800
replications. The bandwidth is 0.1. Results using a bandwidth of 0.05 or 0.15
are similar but not displayed. Neither the coefficient magnitudes nor the level of
statistical significance is very sensitive to choice of bandwidth.
Recall that the OLS model without fixed effects estimates the average treat-
ment effect and restricts the average treatment effect to be equal to the average
treatment effect on the treated. It compares the average high school drop out rate
and college attendance rate for music students and non-music students.4 Propensity
score matching identifies a slightly different effect, the average treatment effect on
the treated. The ATT is an estimate of the effect of participating in band or chorus
on high school outcomes among students who participated in band or chorus. Unlike
OLS, the propensity score matching method eliminates non-music students who are
too different from the music students.
For students who took at least one music class in 10th, 11th, or 12th grade,
the estimated treatment effect is generally slightly larger than what was estimated
with both OLS with school fixed effects and OLS with school characteristics in place
of fixed effects. This finding could have a few different explanation.
It could be that the treatment effect is in fact larger than what the OLS es-
4With fixed effects, it is not clear exactly what treatment effect is being estimated. I have
estimated the effects both with and without school fixed effects. Only for the estimations without
fixed effects am I definitively estimating the ATE.
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timates suggested. If one wants to infer the ATT from OLS estimates, one must
assume that the ATT is equal to the ATE. Propensity score matching does not force
such a restriction, which could allow the ATT to be closer to its true value. Alter-
natively, it might be the case that school fixed effects are necessary to estimate a
causal effect and that, without them, propensity score estimates are still biased up-
ward. Unfortunately, it is not possible to know for sure which is true. However, even
though propensity score matching yields somewhat higher estimates, they are not
dramatically higher, which suggests that the estimates may be close to estimating
the causal effect.
The results suggest that taking at least one music class lowers the likehood of
dropping out of high school by about eight tenths of a percentage point. The mean
drop-out rate is 5.2%, suggesting that participation in at least one high school music
class lowers the likelihood of dropping out of high school by fifteen percent.
Students who took at least one music class are also three percentage points
more likely to attend a postsecondary institution (which is similar to the treatment
effect with OLS) and three percentage points more likely to attend a four-year col-
lege. Based on the mean levels of these variable, this implies a four percent increase
in postsecondary school attendance and a seven percent increase in matriculation
to a four-year college. Taking a music class also improves academic GPA by nearly
a tenth of a point, which is a three percent increase.
The effect of music classes on ACT and SAT scores is very similar to what
was estimated using OLS with school fixed effects. This is true for music classes
in general and for band students. For choir students, the estimated coefficients are
much larger when using propensity score matching. It is not obvious why this would
be the case.
The largest effects are found for students who participated in band. Partici-
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pation in band has a statistically significant effect on every academic achievement
outcome. Band students are nearly eight percentage points more likely to attend a
postsecondary institution. This effect is twice the size of the impact of at least one
music class on attendance at a postsecondary institution. Band also improves SAT
scores by more that thirty points and improves ACT scores by more than half of a
point. Additionally, participating in band improves one’s academic GPA by almost
two tenths of a point.
There are several reasons why one might expect to see the largest effects for
band students. First, participation in band requires discipine. Student must practice
their instrument on their own. They must pay attention during rehearsals. They
may also be required to attend activities outside of the school day. Also, band
requires a special set of skills. Unlike students in other music classes, band students
must read music. While reading music is helpful for choir, it is not necessary. It is
possible that the ability to read music improves students’ academic abilities.
Both the propensity score matching estimates and the OLS estimates suggest
that music classes have large effects on academic outcomes. In the next section, I
use two different definitions of treatment to further explore this relationship.
3.6 Alternative Definitions of Treatment
3.6.1 Music in 10th, 11th, or 12th Grade Only
For both OLS and for propensity score matching, it is important that any
control variables be observed prior to treatment. Therefore, I defined treatment to
be taking a music class in 10th, 11th, or 12th grade, so that any variables observed
in 9th grade could be used as control variables.
An alternative way to define treatment would be to restrict treatment to those
96
who participated in music in 10th, 11th, or 12th grade only. The advantage of this
definition is that the treatment group very clearly did not receive treatment prior
to the baseline. However, this definition of treatment also has several problems.
First, by defining treatment as taking a music class in only 10th, 11th, or
12th grade (and specifically not in 9th grade), I am putting any student who took a
music class in 9th grade in the comparison group. This is far from an ideal division
of treatment and comparison groups. When music participation is defined as taking
a music class in only 10th, 11th, or 12th grade, seventy percent of students that
took at least one music class at any time in high school are considered to be in the
comparison group. Said another way, seventy percent of students who take a music
class in high school take a music class in 9th grade.
Additionally, students who take a music class in 9th grade actually take more
music classes on average than the treatment group. Forty percent of students who
took a music class in 9th grade earn three or more credits of music. Fifteen percent
earned 4.5 credits or more. Among students who took at least one music class in any
grade, only twenty-five percent earned three or more credits in music, and only ten
percent earned 4.5 credits or more. Only five percent of students who took music in
10th, 11th, or 12th grade only earned three or more credits of music. Additionally,
the sample of students who only took a music class in 10th, 11th, or 12th grade is
fairly small compared to the number of student who took a music class in any grade.
While thirty-two percent of all students took at least one music class, only eleven
percent of students took a music class in 10th, 11th, or 12th grade only.
In addition, students who take music in 10th, 11th, or 12th grade are not
representative of music students in general. Table 3.8 displays summary statistics
for all students, music students, non-music students, students who took a music class
in 10th, 11th, or 12th grade only, and for students who either did not take music or
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did not take music in only 10th, 11th, or 12th grade (which would be students who
took music classes in at least 9th grade).
Along individual and family characteristics, the students who took music only
in 10th, 11th, and 12th grade are often more similar to the general student popu-
lation than they are to students who took at least one music class. Additionally,
twenty-five percent of students who did not take music in only 10th, 11th, or 12th
grade did take at least one music class. Thus, there are many treated students in
the comparison group.
To address the issue of treated students being included in the control group, I
can exclude from the sample any student who took a music class in 9th grade. This
would exclude about twenty-two percent of the total students and approximately
seventy percent of the students who took at least one music class. The results from
this estimation are displayed in Table 3.9. The results from the full sample are
presented as a comparison. The results from the restricted sample are surprisingly
similar to the results from the full sample. This suggests that the results may not
be driven by the 9th grade students who are taking a lot of music classes. One
might expect that eliminating students who take the most music classes (9th grade
music students) from the sample would diminish the magnitude of the coefficients.
Because this does not occur, a natural question is whether more music classes lead
to more improved outcomes or whether the full effect of music classes on academic
achievement can be captured by just one music class.
3.6.2 Students Earning One or More Music Credit
In order to explore whether the intensity of music participation affects the
relationship between music classes and academic outcomes, I now define treatment
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as earning one or more full credit in music during one’s high school career. One
credit of courses is equivalent to one year. Therefore, these students have either
taken at least one full year of music or have taken multiple courses that add up to
one credit of music. Approximately fifty-five percent of students who take at least
one music class earn one or more full credit of music. By defining treatment in this
way, I can explore whether the effect of music classes on academic achievement is
greater for students who take more music classes.
Table 3.10 displays the results of this estimation, using both OLS and propen-
sity score matching. The estimate of the impact of any high school music class on
academic outcomes is also shown as a comparison. Looking at the OLS results,
the magnitudes of the coefficients are larger when the treatment is taking one or
more music credit compared to taking any music class. This finding suggests that
more music classes lead to even better outcomes. The results are similar when using
propensity score matching. With the exception of attending a four-year college,
taking one or more credits of music has a larger impact on academic outcomes than
does taking at least one music class.
I can directly test this hypothesis by regressing academic outcomes on the
number of music credits earned in high school. Table 3.11 displays these results.
In addition to number of music credits, I also include music credits squared to
investigate whether the effect changes depending on how many credits one has.
The results indicate that earning more music credits improves academic out-
comes. Whether this effect dimiinishes with the number of credits earned is unclear.
The coefficient on music credits squared is not statistically significant in any regres-
sion, but it is consistent in some cases with a dimishing treatment effect.
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3.7 Extension to the Effect of Participating in Extracurricular Ac-
tivities
A natural question is whether the approaches taken here could be used to
measure the effect of participating in extracurricular activities on academic achieve-
ment. Consider the standard matching estimators to estimate the treatment on the
treated of extracurricular activities. There are two problems in applying match-
ing here. First, eighty-four percent of students partake in extracurricular activities,
leaving only sixteen percent of the students as the comparison group, and it is well
known that matching estimators do poorly in this situation (see, e.g., Ham et al.
(2011)). Secondly my view is that those not partaking in any extracurricular ac-
tivities will make up a very select group, i.e. much more select than taking or not
taking music classes, and I only have 9th grade GPA to deal with the selection.
Thus, I decided not to pursue matching estimators.
Standard OLS estimates of the the effect of partaking in extracurricular ac-
tivities can only control for selection through school fixed effects, and again this
approach will provide unconvincing estimates. Perhaps the best approach is to use
a regression which conditions on both 9th grade GPA and school fixed effects. As
in the current chapter, this can be thought of as a simple matching estimator. I ran
this regression and found the effect of partaking in extracurricular activities to have
positive effects on academic achievement. Parcipation in at least one extracurricular
activity is estimated to lead to a nine percentage point decrease in dropping out of
high school, a nineteen percentage point increase in attendance at a postsecondary
institution, a tenth of a point increase in academic GPA, and a half point increase in
ACT scores. However, I am not convinced that this approach sufficiently deals with
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selection, and thus have chosen not to make this analysis into a separate chapter.
3.8 Conclusion
This research investigates the impact of high school music classes on student
academic achievement. Very little research has been able to estimate a causal rela-
tionship between music classes and academic outcomes. I find evidence that while
selection bias is driving some of the positive correlation between music and academic
achievement, there seems to be a strong causal impact of music class on academic
outcomes.
I utilize two empirical approaches to estimate a the causal relationship be-
tween music classes and academic outcomes. First, I use OLS with school fixed
effects. Second, I use propensity score matches. Each approach has advantages and
disadvantages. For both approaches, a drawback is that the data disclose nothing
about a student’s prior musical activities. I must assume that the treatment effect
estimates the impact of high school music classes on academic outcomes. However,
it is likely that students who take high school music classes also took middle school
music classes. And if these middle school music classes also have a positive impact
on academic outcomes, then this research will overstate the treatment effect.
When comparing OLS with school fixed effects and propensity score matching,
the advantage of OLS with school fixed effects is the ability to include fixed effects.
When I replace fixed effects with school characteristics, the estimated treatment
effects are slightly higher, suggesting that school characteristics will not capture
all of the effect of individuals’ school on academic outcome. The disadvantages of
OLS are its restrictive functional form and the fact that it generally restricts the
average treatment effect on the treatment to be equal to the average treatment
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effect (though this may not be true once fixed effects are estimated). Propensity
score matching does not restrict the average treatment effect on the treated to be
equal to the average treatment effect, and it allows for a less restrictive functional
form. However, propensity score matching is unable to accomodate school fixed
effects. Because of this, the matching estimates may be biased upward.
The results suggest that taking at least one music class in high school leads to
a fifteen percent decrease in the likelihood of dropping out of high school. Taking at
least one music class also leads to large increases in enrollment at a postsecondary
school, increases in enrollment at a four-year college, and small increases in students’
academic GPA. Taking at least one music class also leads to approximately two
percent improvement in ACT or SAT test scores.
The largest effects are found for students who participate in high school band.
High school band students are between five and eight percentage points more likely
to attend a postsecondary school and approximately five percentage points more
likely to attend a four year college. Band students also see statistically significant
increases in SAT and ACT scores, scoring approximately three percent higher on
both tests. Participating in high school band also leads to increases of about two-
tenths of a points in students’ academic GPA. There are several reasons why the
band students might see larger results. One reason is because band students are
required to read music. Like speaking another language, reading music requires
individuals to think in different ways. Another reason that band students might see
more improvements over other music students is that band students will generally
need to practice outside of school. This requires discipline and a more intense study
of music. Both of these factors could lead to improved outcomes.
The propensity score matching results are similar in magnitude to the OLS re-
sults, though the estimated treatment effects are slightly larger when using propen-
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sity score matching. This finding suggests that with a large number of control
variables, OLS with school fixed effects does quite well in estimating the effect of
music classes on student academic outcomes. It also suggests that propensity score
matching may overestimate the treatment effect, as it cannot be estimated with
school fixed effects.
In addition to the positive impact of taking any music class on academic out-
comes, I find that taking more music classes leads to even more improved outcomes.
Each credit of music earned increases the likelihood of attending college by one
percentage point. Earning more music credits effects similar gains on the other
academic outcomes.
This paper demonstrates a strong positive effect of taking music classes on
improving academic outcomes. The results are robust to different specifications,
different samples, and different definitions of music student. Further research should
further explore the types of music that are most beneficial. Additional work explor-
ing the impact of the intensity of music study would also be beneficial.
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Music Student 0.324 1.000
(0.46785)
Choir Student 0.156 0.482
(0.36276) (0.49972)
Band Student 0.111 0.343
(0.31414) (0.47478)
At Least 1 Music Credit 0.177 0.546
(0.38138) (0.49793)
Music in 10th, 11th or 12th Grade 0.258 0.798
(0.43760) (0.40175)
Academic Outcomes:
ACT 21.5 22.1 21.2
(5.05) (5.05) (5.01)
SAT 1005 1027 991
(207.26) (205.72) (207.02)
Dropout 0.052 0.026 0.064
(0.22136) (0.15868) (0.24488)
Attend Postsecondary School 0.753 0.829 0.715
(0.43136) (0.37698) (0.45138)
Attend 4-yr College 0.451 0.529 0.413
(0.49761) (0.49921) (0.49232)
Individual Characteristics:
Female 0.502 0.584 0.463
(0.50001) (0.49299) (0.49865)
Black 0.158 0.151 0.161
(0.36479) (0.35830) (0.36782)
Asian 0.116 0.111 0.119
(0.32063) (0.31366) (0.32389)
Other Race 0.121 0.085 0.139
(0.32631) (0.27870) (0.34544)
Hispanic 0.144 0.102 0.165
(0.35135) (0.30208) (0.37089)
English Native Lang. 0.831 0.873 0.811
(0.37447) (0.33310) (0.39140)
Academic Honor 0.353 0.407 0.326
(0.47783) (0.49138) (0.46894)
Club Participation 0.238 0.282 0.216
104
(0.42572) (0.44987) (0.41177)
Ever took Remedial Course 0.115 0.109 0.118
(0.31874) (0.31142) (0.32218)
Family Characteristics:
Two Parents 0.749 0.764 0.741
(0.43384) (0.42482) (0.43793)
Mother HS 0.268 0.252 0.276
(0.44303) (0.43395) (0.44711)
Mother Some College 0.329 0.345 0.322
(0.46999) (0.47531) (0.46727)
Mother College 0.183 0.208 0.172
(0.38707) (0.40572) (0.37729)
Mother ≥College 0.089 0.105 0.082
(0.28513) (0.30706) (0.27371)
Father HS 0.281 0.278 0.283
(0.44963) (0.44811) (0.45037)
Father Some College 0.264 0.269 0.261
(0.44058) (0.44341) (0.43922)
Father College 0.178 0.192 0.171
(0.38259) (0.39426) (0.37670)
Father ≥College 0.140 0.166 0.127
(0.34667) (0.37239) (0.33294)
Parent in PTO 0.262 0.302 0.241
(0.43953) (0.45917) (0.42765)
Mother Native US 0.779 0.819 0.760
(0.41472) (0.38547) (0.42734)
Father Native US 0.780 0.815 0.762
(0.41419) (0.38800) (0.42566)
Family has Computer 0.888 0.909 0.878
(0.31506) (0.28737) (0.32748)
$25k ≤Fam. Inc. ≤50k 0.305 0.295 0.309
(0.46032) (0.45618) (0.46224)
$50k ≤Fam. Inc. ≤75k 0.204 0.214 0.199
(0.40291) (0.41028) (0.39927)
Family Inc.≥75k 0.281 0.308 0.269
(0.44969) (0.46182) (0.44322)
SES 0.042 0.144 -0.007
(0.74301) (0.72596) (0.74614)
School Characteristics:
Private 0.204 0.258 0.195
(0.4028) (0.4377) (0.3964)
Urban 0.346 0.387 0.339
(0.4756) (0.4873) (0.4734)
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Rural 0.173 0.161 0.175
(0.3781) (0.3679) (0.3797)
Suburban 0.482 0.451 0.486
(0.4997) (0.4978) (0.4998)
% Ltd English Proficiency 4.28 3.31 4.44
(8.34) (7.56) (8.45)
% Free Lunch 24.34 25.42 24.17
(25.57) (27.29) (25.29)
% Teachers Certified 91.97 90.76 92.15
(18.28) (20.20) (17.96)
Region:
Northeast 0.180 0.188 0.176
(0.38390) (0.39076) (0.38052)
South 0.367 0.331 0.385
(0.48210) (0.47054) (0.48658)
West 0.199 0.177 0.210
(0.39962) (0.38133) (0.40764)



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9th Grade GPA 0.04623*** 0.04339*** 0.02587***
(0.00685) (0.00444) (0.00789)
Female 0.08044*** 0.00396 0.16166***
(0.00964) (0.00607) (0.02848)
Black 0.04325** 0.02010* 0.02111
(0.01791) (0.01119) (0.01389)
Asian 0.02813 0.02790* 0.01016
(0.02247) (0.01652) (0.01715)
Other Race -0.01597 -0.01535 0.00292
(0.01955) (0.01177) (0.01546)
Hispanic -0.03697* 0.02352 -0.03461**
(0.02003) (0.01512) (0.01379)
English Native Lang. 0.03316 0.04129*** 0.00577
(0.02022) (0.01045) (0.01581)
Two Parents 0.00574 0.00247 0.00211
(0.01257) (0.00790) (0.00920)
Mother HS -0.03086 -0.00412 -0.01089
(0.02028) (0.01403) (0.01519)
Mother Some College 0.00549 0.00932 0.00981
(0.02246) (0.01542) (0.01701)
Mother College 0.03306 0.02158 0.01557
(0.02760) (0.01940) (0.02079)
Mother >College 0.02697 0.02373 0.00398
(0.03333) (0.02382) (0.02421)
Father HS 0.06181*** 0.03248** 0.04390***
(0.02046) (0.01528) (0.01633)
Father Some College 0.06347*** 0.04525*** 0.02856*
(0.02230) (0.01692) (0.01728)
Father College 0.06404** 0.03651* 0.04998**
(0.02686) (0.01992) (0.02198)
Father >College 0.08108** 0.04126* 0.06322**
(0.03165) (0.02339) (0.02664)
Mother Native US 0.04773** 0.01744 0.04373***
(0.02106) (0.01294) (0.01435)
Father Native US -0.03910* -0.01024 -0.00597
(0.02237) (0.01417) (0.01660)
Fam. Computer 0.01843 0.01777* 0.00598
(0.01731) (0.01058) (0.01295)
25K ≤ Family Inc. ≤ 75K -0.01685 0.00398 0.00279
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(0.01610) (0.01041) (0.01194)
Fam. Inc.≥ $75K -0.06397*** -0.02836** -0.00519
(0.02025) (0.01232) (0.01535)
SES 0.01528 0.01845* -0.01583
(0.01786) (0.01121) (0.01480)
Northeast -0.02561 -0.03344*** -0.04334***
(0.01618) (0.00773) (0.00992)
South -0.09316*** -0.02515*** -0.08576***
(0.01195) (0.00718) (0.00793)
West -0.04474*** -0.03197*** -0.04700***
(0.01476) (0.00816) (0.00931)
Private 0.00851 -0.01199 -0.00494
(0.01678) (0.00914) (0.01172)
% Free Lunch 0.00073*** 0.00069*** -0.00077***
(0.00026) (0.00016) (0.00020)
Urban -0.00975 -0.01467** -0.01115
(0.01161) (0.00722) (0.00840)
Rural 0.06371*** 0.04993*** 0.01432
(0.01374) (0.00939) (0.01519)
% Teachers Certified -0.00046 0.00046** -0.00102***
(0.00029) (0.00020) (0.00020)
% Ltd English -0.00351*** -0.00122** -0.00069
(0.00076) (0.00050) (0.00056)
Northeast × Private -0.01512 0.03764
(0.02814) (0.02334)
Black × Private -0.02987 -0.00382
(0.03735) (0.02670)
Female × SES 0.00657
(0.01084)
Female × GPA -0.02404**
(0.00987)
Female × Rural 0.03408*
(0.02011)
(1) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(2) Standard errors in parentheses
(3) Coefficients are marginal effects from probit estimation.
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Table 3.4: Balancing Test. Treatment = Music in 10th, 11th, or 12th Grade
Difference Paired t-statistic




Other Race -0.00184 -0.25
Hispanic -0.00348 -0.45
English is Native Lang. 0.00127 0.14
Two Parents 0.00116 0.1
Mother HS -0.00184 -0.15
Mother Some College 0.00556 0.41
Mother College -0.00175 -0.15
Mother ≥ College -0.00169 -0.19
Father HS -0.00243 -0.19
Father Some College 0.00492 0.38
Father College 0.0029 0.25
Father ≥ College -0.00314 -0.29
Mother US Native -0.00134 -0.13
Father US Native -0.00198 -0.19
Family has computer 0.00102 0.13
$25k ≤ Family Income ≤ $50k 0.00223 0.16
$50k ≤ Family Income ≤ $75k -0.00256 -0.19






% Free Lunch 0.158 0.24
Urban -0.00304 -0.23
Rural 0.01064 0.88
% Certified -0.019 -0.03
% Ltd English -0.0311 -0.17
Northeast × Private -0.00107 -0.18
Black × Private 0.00038 0.1
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Table 3.5: Balancing Test. Treatment = Choir Student




Other Race 0.0006 0.06
Hispanic -0.003 -0.3
English is Native Lang. 0.0044 0.37
Two Parents 0.00168 0.1
Mother HS -0.00251 -0.14
Mother Some College 0.00387 0.2
Mother College -0.00359 -0.21
Mother ≥ College 0.0029 0.24
Father HS 0.00492 0.27
Father Some College 0.00067 0.04
Father College 0.00296 0.18
Father ≥ College -0.00327 -0.21
Mother US Native 0.00053 0.04
Father US Native 0.00288 0.21
Family has computer 9E-05 0.01
$25k ≤ Family Income ≤ $50k 0.00166 0.08
$50k ≤ Family Income ≤ $75k -0.00324 -0.17






% Free Lunch -0.045 -0.06
Urban -0.01217 -0.67
Rural 0.01442 0.83
% Certified -0.257 -0.28
% Ltd English 0.0632 0.25
Northeast × Private -0.00138 -0.14
Black × Private 0.00273 0.43
Female × SES -0.00144 -0.06
Female × GPA 0.0402 0.65
Female × Rural 0.01013 0.65
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Table 3.6: Balancing Test. Treatment = Band Student
Difference Paired t-statistic




Other Race -0.00598 -0.53
Hispanic -0.00936 -0.74
English is Native Lang. 0.00685 0.54
Two Parents 0.00219 0.12
Mother HS -0.00087 -0.04
Mother Some College 0.0037 0.16
Mother College 0.00049 0.02
Mother ≥ College 0.00107 0.07
Father HS -0.00218 -0.11
Father Some College 0.0093 0.43
Father College 0.00024 0.01
Father ≥ College -0.0019 -0.11
Mother US Native 0.00569 0.35
Father US Native 0.00496 0.3
Family has computer 0.00503 0.44
$25k ≤ Family Income ≤ $50k 0.00862 0.37
$50k ≤ Family Income ≤ $75k -0.00313 -0.14






% Free Lunch 0.287 0.27
Urban -0.00492 -0.24
Rural 0.01395 0.65
% Certified 0.36 0.49
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